January 27, 2011
Let’s Make a Deal. (Please, I’m Begging.)

Like a lot of other Cleveland sports junkies, I grow a little more frustrated every day by the Cavs. However, I’m no longer talking about the record or the lack of defense. I’m not talking about the players. I’m not even talking about the infallible Byron Scott (for once).

I’m talking about the front office.

Clearly, the team isn’t going to turn things around. At this point they’ll be lucky to avoid the worst record in modern NBA history. But I worry, because I have seen nothing in weeks that indicates the front office has accepted this unavoidable reality.

Mike and I have already argued on this blog for months that the best possible move is for the Cavs to declare the present a total loss and do anything they can to prepare for the future. By now, we’re certainly not alone, and it’s no longer a revolutionary opinion (if it ever was).

Yet every day I check for Cavs’ trade rumors, and every day I come up empty.

So for all the talk about the need to collect assets and build through the draft, I have no real evidence that the front office is making overtures to try to do that. And if they’re not, I cannot for the life of me imagine why. Because at this point, that’s their only function besides scouting the NCAA and Euroleagues—making this team worse now (and better later) by pawning off any semi-valuable players to contenders at the highest possible price. 

Other people have written about how Dan Gilbert’s near-psychotic need to win faster than LeBron has already hindered the rebuilding process. The argument is that after being humiliated by James, Gilbert convinced himself that the Cavs should try to compete for the playoffs this year as a way of saving face.

Of course, I don’t have behind-the-scenes knowledge of what’s going on in the owner’s box, but I suspect that there’s a good deal of truth to this theory. All you have to do is realize that whatever the Cavs could’ve gotten for Andy over the summer would’ve been better than what they can get for him for the rest of this season, which is basically nothing.

The real problem is that I now fear that Gilbert will try to save face by holding onto would-be “stars” like Jamison and Mo in hopes of avoiding the worst record ever—without realizing that those big(ger) names are directly contributing to the reasons the team is losing as much as it is. (To prove Byron Scott is either a hypocrite, out of options, or out of touch, consider that Jamison is averaging 31.3mpg this season despite Scott’s insistence that only players who will lock down on defense will see playing time. Watching Jamison try to D up reminds me of that moment in every ghost movie where someone or something passes directly through the body of a specter and leaves all witnesses amazed and terrified.)

I admit that just because I’m not seeing rumors on the web doesn’t mean that talks aren’t happening behind closed doors. The Cavs’ case is also hurt by injuries to some of their more tradeable assets: Andy out for the season, Mo having only appeared in 34 games because of nagging ailments.

But between now and the trading deadline (which is only a month away), I sincerely hope to see strong evidence that Chris Grant and company are working the phones like mad to try to get what they can for what they have. If they’re not—or if Gilbert’s ego is holding them back in any way—this rebuilding process is going to be as delayed and bumpy as major real-world construction projects so often are. Having been up close and personal with one of those for a number of years, I hope for the city’s and the fan base’s sake that none of us have to suffer through that.

-T

January 26, 2011
Competition and the Popularity of Pro Sports

In yesterday’s post, Tim wrote some things that I didn’t wholeheartedly agree with (it happens from time to time). I’m overgeneralizing a bit, but his argument was essentially that, of the three major professional sports,  the NFL is the most friendly to small market teams, citing competitive balance as his measuring stick. 

There are, of course, different ways to gauge competitive balance. The easiest way - which doesn’t necessarily make it the best way - is to look at the number of different teams that have won championships over an extended period of time.

In the past thirty years then (since 1980), here is the breakdown: 

NBA: 8 champions
NFL: 15 champions
MLB: 19 champions

As you can see, Major League Baseball - despite Tim’s assertion that its system is “out of whack”  - has produced the most different champions of any of the three professional sports.

Admittedly, MLB, NBA, and NFL have gone through multiple collective bargaining agreements over this time period. MLB’s revenue sharing system has been in place since the year 2000. In those 11 years, there have been 9 different World Series Champions. 

Not bad. 

In relation to this, I thought it was worth looking at some poll numbers CNBC’s sports business reporter Darren Rovell tweeted earlier today. Here are the favorite sports amongst US fans, according to SportsBusiness Journal and Daily

NFL: 31%
MLB: 17%
College Football: 12%
Auto Racing: 7%
NBA: 6%

These numbers suggest that competitive balance - as measured by percentage chance your favorite team has of winning the championship - probably has some significance when it comes to the favorite sports of Americans. 

There are obviously other factors to consider, as well. Tim commented on the notion that MLB and its season, which consists of 162 3 hour games, doesn’t fit with the speed of life in the 21st century. I would agree. That may be why, according to Rovell via Harris Interactive, MLB has had the greatest drop in popularity over the past 25 years (a 6% decline). 

On the contrary, America’s most popular sport, the NFL, has only 16 games in its regular season, all of which are played on the same two days of the week, each weekend, for 17 weeks (minus the odd Thursday night games). This implies that the NFL necessitates a time commitment that is right in line with what the country is willing to give. Needless to say, the NBA and its 82 game season full of 2 and a half hour games isn’t much better than baseball … except for the fact, maybe, that a large portion of the NBA season occurs during the winter when there is less to do outside in most parts of the country. 

Race, I would argue, is another factor in all of this, albeit one that is less spoken about. There is certainly a school of thought that says black, tattooed basketball players - the most visible of all the pro athletes - project an image that not all white sports fans are comfortable with. 

And we can’t forget the games themselves. Football has a lot of dead space, maybe as much as baseball. Possibly more. Definitely more than basketball. But when the action starts it is typically fast, violent, and unpredictable. The bar culture - and NFL Sunday Ticket - which allows people to go to one place and watch all of the games … and all of the players on their fantasy teams … simultaneously is another boon to pro football. 

Side note: college football would be smart to emulate this program by allowing fantasy football, which to my knowledge, they do not. 

Ultimately, I think we have to acknowledge that winning championships - and the notion of competitive balance - may not be the be all end all for the majority of sports fans in America. An easy to watch sport, without an excruciating time commitment - event programming, if you will - may be the biggest advantage of all, especially since the NFL can have an equally simplistic fantasy component that allows some of that competitive spirit to be transferred directly to the fan.

After all, might it be more compelling to see if YOU will beat your friends in fantasy football than to see if some guys you don’t know but root for anyway beat some other guys you don’t know but choose to root against?  

I think it might. 

January 25, 2011
NFL: the Official League of Non-Major Markets(?)

Yesterday, Mike made an excellent point about what dark clouds the new NBA free agent circus may hold for small-to-mid-market franchises. His conclusion syncs up nicely with something I’ve been thinking about since the end of the Browns season.

The question is this: Is it possible that in a few years, the NFL will be the only sustainable pro sport in non-major markets, i.e. the only one where cities like Cleveland can legitimately hope to compete for a title?

Based on the available evidence, I believe the answer may be ‘yes.’

I’ve considered a few crucial differences between the NBA and NFL in this regard. I’ve ignored Major League Baseball because their system is currently so far out of wack—see: the complete lack of a salary cap—that it hardly seems worth addressing. (Let alone that MLB’s largest problem is that almost no one in contemporary American life wants to watch 162 regular season games that last 3.5+ hours each.)

Unless the parameters change in the new CBA, rookie contracts will be one major determinant of the answer. The current rules dictate that a player drafted in the first half of the first round can be signed to a 6-year contract; players in the second half of the first round to a 5-year contract; and players after the first round to a 4-year contract. (Thanks to Ask the Commish for the details.)

The contrast with the NBA is evident immediately. For first-round picks, the longest contract a team can extend is 4 years, with the latter 2 years both existing as team options. If a contract extension isn’t worked out by the end of the 4th year, the team can put forth a qualifying offer for a 5th year—but that only makes the player a restricted free agent. Further, if the player decides to play out the 5th year, he obtains veto power over any trades, then becomes an unrestricted free agent the following summer. (Thanks to Hoopsworld for the low-down.)

Perhaps counter-intuitively, NBA second round picks gain leverage even faster than their first-round cohorts. The longest contract an NBA team will normally negotiate here is 2-years of nonguaranteed money. However, if a second round pick pans out in a major way, he’s free to test the market as quickly as his sophomore, or at worst, junior season in the league.

The end result of this comparison? Current NFL rules protect their franchises by providing longer guarantees for potential star players than their NBA counterparts.

Consider the following:  In 2010, the St. Louis Rams signed Sam Bradford to a 6-year contract. Meanwhile, LeBron was a Cav for only 7 total seasons: 4 on his rookie contract, another 3 thanks to an extension.

This example is one where simple subtraction simply doesn’t tell the story. Yes, we’re only talking about a net 1 year difference between the Rams’ agreement with Bradford and the Cavs’ two agreements with LeBron. But the difference is continuity. After going 7-9 and barely missing the playoffs in his rookie season, the Rams’ front office knows that Bradford is a franchise player that they have for the next 5 seasons, guaranteed. As we all know too well, the Cavs didn’t have such a long-term safety net. Instead, they allowed themselves to be forced into a series of panic upgrades that were never conducive to a strong, long-term foundation.

The reason was obvious: LeBron’s free agency was always pending, so they had to prove they could win now in order to keep him around. The Rams, meanwhile, have half a decade to build around Bradford.

The contrast carries through the lower branches of each sport’s draft: by the time a second round NFL pick can become a free agent, a second round NBA pick will have had the free agency option two or even three years earlier.

All of this plays into the viability of pro football versus pro basketball in cities like Cleveland. As proven by LeBron and Chris Bosh, young NBA stars are no longer prone to take slightly more money to stay with the franchise that drafted them. Their desire to build “super teams” is hardly surprising, given the (Mesa favorite) fact that only 8 different NBA franchises have won the title in the past 30 years.

But young NFL stars are basically locked into their first franchise for a substantial time period from the starting gun. With a skillful personnel department, NFL teams have the time they need to convince budding stars to stick around via complementary moves. Given the numbers, those players also have less incentive to migrate to specific alternatives than their NBA counterparts anyway; in the same 30 year period, 14 different NFL teams have won the Super Bowl.

These rookie contract considerations aren’t the only elements that empower small-to-mid-market NFL teams. Their ability to “franchise” a player otherwise ready to hit the open market is another powerful tool in the quest for competitive balance.

For the uninitiated, the franchise tag essentially blocks a player at the end of his contract from entering free agency. If he’s hit with an exclusive franchise tag, the player cannot negotiate with other teams, but is compensated by receiving one year’s salary equal to either the average of the top 5 salaries at his position in the current NFL season, or 120% of his previous contract year, whichever is greater. If he’s hit with a non-exclusive franchise tag, the player is compensated by receiving either the average of the top 5 salaries at his position in the previous NFL season, or 120% of his previous contract year, whichever is greater.

However, non-exclusive franchise players also maintain the right to negotiate with other teams. If they sign an offer sheet elsewhere, the original franchise has the right to match the offer, or else refuse it and receive two first-round draft picks from the franchise player’s chosen destination. In comparison to the NBA equivalent, this system is vastly preferable to any franchise unable to maintain a star player. Two first rounders in the NFL draft is a HUGE bounty. By contrast, the best an NBA team can do when a star chooses to go elsewhere is normally a few infinitely less valuable future draft picks and a trade exception. (We can all see how much that trade exception has helped the Cavs this season.)

If all of the above weren’t enough, also consider the prevalence of undrafted NFL free agents or late round picks not only making an NFL roster, but becoming impact players. (Peter King examines this phenomenon briefly in his most recent Monday Morning Quarterback - just scroll down to “The [Super Bowl] match-up is a reward to two organizations that built teams.”) The probability of a second round pick or undrafted NBA free agent having the same kind of effect on a team’s fortune seems to be much rarer—and again, even when it does happen, the team that took a chance on the player in question almost immediately has to work to try to retain his services.

Admittedly, I have no idea what the new NBA and NFL collective bargaining agreements will look like. However, if current rules and current trends largely remain, then I sincerely believe that we are rapidly approaching a time when the NFL is the only legitimate game in town for cities like Cleveland. Here’s hoping I’m dead wrong.

-T

January 24, 2011
Why Is It Okay to Talk About Carmelo?

I’d be surprised if there is a single person out there reading this who is not sick and tired of hearing about the Carmelo Anthony trade talks. Include me in that mix. 

So why the hell am I writing about it? 

Good question. Here is my explanation: 

You may remember that during the lead up to LeBron James’s free agency, the NBA doled out multiple fines for team officials who dared to speak about James before July 1st. The NBA took a hard stance that mentioning LeBron’s name would qualify as tampering. 

Recalling the fines that Mark Cuban and Steve Kerr were hit with the other day got me thinking…

Why the hell is Mikhail Prokhorov, the majority owner of the New Jersey Nets, allowed to openly discuss trading for Anthony at a press conference ? 

Furthermore, why is Carmelo allowed to talk about being traded on almost a daily basis? Players consistently get fined for talking about trades, as well. Sometimes they even get fined when their agents talk about being traded.

In my opinion, this strange turn in the NBA’s handling of public conversations about trades and players that are under contract with other teams signals one thing: 

David Stern watched what LeBron did for the league by implicitly courting a consortium of other teams from 2007-2010. Stern watched what all of the player movement this past offseason did to hype the league entering opening night. He understands that it is free marketing. And Stern is now prepared to encourage it. 

This is a bad thing for fans who prefer rooting for one team over taking a casual interest in the NBA in general. It suggests, to me, that Bird Rights - which were created as a means of encouraging players to stay on one team for the length of their careers - are on their way out in the new collective bargaining agreement. And, if indeed this happens, then it also quite possibly means the end of good basketball in second and third tier markets. 

Basketball is a superstar driven sport, more than any other. The lack of real superstars in the league contributes to the lack of parity, or competitive balance, or whatever you prefer to call it. Without Bird Rights this will only get worse. For fans who enjoy clinging on to one team and one team only, be ready for a bumpy ride. 

LeBron really has changed everything. 

January 21, 2011
The Problem with Pace

Another day of the NBA season, another update on the continuing downward spiral of the 2010-11 Cavs.

Wayne Winston of adjusted plus/minus fame released his latest weighted NBA efficiency ratings yesterday. The Cavs are now even more firmly cemented in last place than before. Overall, their Winston-calculated efficiency differential has plummeted to a knee-buckling -10.41 points per 100 possessions.

The last time I checked this same stat, the gap between Byron Scott’s squad and the 29th place Sacramento Kings was a depressing -3 points per 100 possessions. As of today, that gap has widened to nearly 5 points per 100 possessions, as the Kings’ weighted differential clocks in at -5.86.

In other words, the Cavs—by Winston’s statistical measure, anyway—have gotten 67% worse in the past week.

Admittedly, this has to do with the fact that Winston’s ratings are heavily weighted based on recent performance, and having a 55 point loss in your recent past is a recipe for disaster on that front.

I just checked Hoop Data for the raw efficiency differential, hoping for some kind of silver lining. Guess what? The Cavs’ unadjusted efficiency differential is even worse. They trail the rest of the league at -12.1 points per 100 possessions. Salt in the wound: they trail the Kings (-7.5) by almost exactly the same margin here as in Winston’s adjusted rankings. 

This seems like it should only be able to take place in a parallel universe. And yet, here we are: at a point where it’s indisputable that the 2010-11 Cavs can neither defend nor score.

However, they’re running. According to Hoop Data, they now rank 12th in the league in pace—dangerously close to surpassing the “average” zone and being considered “up-tempo.”

Herein lies the problem, though. John Krolik of Cavs: The Blog pointed out earlier this week (thanks to some time spent on Synergy) that Byron Scott’s Cavs score fewer points on transition opportunities than any other team in the league.

So yes, the team is getting out in transition. But they’re terrible at scoring in transition, so it’s not helping them to run.

In fact, it may be hurting them.

Consider this: if you equate “fast” with “good,” then pace is potentially the only category in which the Cavs have shown steady progress this season. But as their pace has increased, their efficiency differential has plummeted—and their record alongside it.

In other words, the available evidence suggests that speeding up the tempo makes the Cavs less efficient and therefore, less likely to win.

Byron Scott does appear to be holding up one end of his introductory presser by forcing the Cavs to be a running team. But this raises the question: should they be one? Is that where their strengths (I use that term loosely) lie? Or would the team be better served by slowing the pace down and conserving some energy for defense?

With all the injuries and the psychological weight of so much losing, it may be a moot point. To me, though, a coach worth his paycheck would investigate this idea, especially after losing 24 of the team’s last 25 games. (Or whatever the actual number is. At this point, it hardly warrants the time needed to fact-check.)

Instead, Scott seems committed to trying to keep the pedal to the floor. But with only a month before the All-Star break and over a month since the Cavs’ league-low 8th win, it’s entirely possible that Scott is simply speeding his way toward the worst season in NBA history.

-T