Jose Mesa Is Dead

The Browns Tell You It's OK To Suck Forever As Long As You Never Quit

Tue, 06 Dec 2011 06:22:39 -0800

The Browns posted the above article on their Facebook page today. I was going to comment on the post there, but I thought, “What the hell?” why not write a blurb for Mesa instead.

Here then are my thoughts —

LOL at the organization that has gotten knocked down about 42K times since reforming in 1999, only been to the playoffs once, and generally shown little to no improvement from year to year emphasizing “getting up after each fall.”

Last time I checked, based on the fact that the team is still an operational business that is part of the National Football League they are contractually obligated to “get up after each fall.”

Congratulations, Browns. You were scheduled to play 16 games this year. Therefore, you must “bounce back” against the Steelers.

And don’t worry: No matter what, your fan base will stay loyal.

Pause

Tue, 08 Feb 2011 22:21:58 -0800

No Mesa post tonight. Tim and I have been discussing how to proceed, given the lack of relevant conversation starters on the Cleveland sports scene at the moment. We seem torn between a new post-when-it’s-called-for schedule or a complete overhaul that incorporates a fresh, high concept idea.

Tim or I will update with more information ASAP.

Thanks, as always, for caring.

Mike.

On Speculation

Tue, 08 Feb 2011 01:40:58 -0800

Yesterday, ESPN’s Jerry Crasnick wrote a column in which he made out offseason report cards for every team in the AL Central. The Indians placed last in Crasnick’s list, with a ‘D’ grade. His reasoning was simple: Chris Antonetti made no moves other than signing Austin Kearns—not exactly an impact contract—whereas every other team in the division made at least one banner-headline trade or signing.

These grades are the sports journalism equivalent of white bread—completely empty calories that satisfy hunger for only the minimum possible time period.

And yet, I can’t even be upset about them because I am one of the hordes of people who is demanding to be fed at staggering pace.

Let me explain.

With rare exceptions, writers making grandiose statements about the future of entire teams based on current moves (or lack thereof) are all but useless. Yes, occasionally, someone like Peter King will correctly predict the Super Bowl match-up in the pre-season, but for every one of those hits there is a colossal collection of misses.

For another quick home-town example, consider that Mel Kiper Jr did a column a few weeks ago in which he regraded every NFL team’s 2010 draft. In that column, most teams’ choices ended up looking considerably better or much worse to Kiper after the rookies in question actually played a full season than they did when they’d just put on a hat with their new team’s logo. (The Browns, for instance, were raised from a C to a B+.)

This shouldn’t be surprising, with hindsight being 20/20 and all that. Almost inevitably, the writers who compile these columns will admit that they’re barely ever right. (King, to his credit, has repeatedly made the point that his correct Super Bowl prediction was possibly a once-in-a-career anomaly.) In many cases the preseason picks become recurring sources of good-natured ridicule among writers’ colleagues and fans.

All of this begs the question: Why do they write these columns in the first place?

Easy: because there’s demand for information, and the writers have to fill space.

When tasked with writing about sports in a dead zone like the MLB offseason, you’re forced to manufacture stories. Aside from minor deals like Vlad Guerrero signing with the Orioles last week, the “breaking news” portion of MLB offseason activity is over. Spring training hasn’t started yet. And it’ll take til at least July before anyone really has any idea which teams are legitimately good and which aren’t.

As Mike noted yesterday, this is true of a certain period in all sports. Right now is almost indisputably the worst segment of the sports calendar year. The only major league working is the NBA, and they haven’t even entered into the stretch playoff run yet. (Not that it will make much of a difference if you’re a Cavs fan.)

This entire situation is made worse by the fact that there’s a high probability that both the NFL and NBA will go through lock-outs in 2011. If that happens, we’re all going to be seeing speculative sports journalism taken to a whole new level between now and 2012.

I don’t begrudge any writers this—it’s the machine that we as sports fans/consumers have created. Every day we log onto various sites demanding new information to help us whittle away time. The writers need to say SOMETHING, so they create predictions, then re-evaluate those predictions mid-season, then re-re-evaluate them at the end of the season. If they don’t, websites go dead, TV shows go dark, and people lose jobs. It’s self-preservation, really.

In fact, this post itself is a perfect example. What the hell is going on in the world of Cleveland sports that REALLY needs to be discussed right now? Not much, as far as I can tell. And based on his comments from yesterday, Mike agrees with me. So for the purpose of creating a post, I dug out an article about the Tribe just so I could spend time writing about how useless the article was because, in theory, there are people who are going to come to this website at some point today looking for content. Ironic, right?

It will be an interesting experiment to see if there’s actually a lower quantity of sports news out there if a double-lock-out happens. My guess is that there won’t be. There’s too much demand for information, at least from the major providers, for them to just allow the cycle to lapse. So my guess is we’re all going to have to get used to the idea that a greater and greater quantity of the stories available to readers will be based on rumors and predictions rather than actual facts or performance. And I as a writer am going to have to get used to the idea that the same will be true of the “stories” I generate.

In short, Jerry Crasnick, I ain’t mad at you. We’re all playing the same game.

-T

What Does It All Mean?

Mon, 07 Feb 2011 05:00:07 -0800

This past week we saw the Cavaliers lose their record 24th straight game…

We saw the Orlando Magic lose to the Boston Celtics and the Miami Heat…

And we just saw the Pittsburgh Steelers lose Super Bowl XLV to the Green Bay Packers.

What does it all mean?

I honestly have very little idea.

(When was the last time you saw a sports columnist admit that?)

Truth be told, my interest in professional sports is sagging. This is natural. Like all of us, I only have a limited amount of free time. The Cleveland teams - those that my dad raised me on, and that became something for me, him, and my brother to bond over once we became adults - are, at the moment, uninteresting.

The Browns’ season is over. I’m not going to analyze the draft. The Cavs are pathetic enough that I’m considering writing a new post every day on how awful Antawn Jamison is at defense. Free agency, for the Indians, is non-existent. Spring training is not that far off … and also not that compelling.

The Browns, the Cavs, and the Indians have always been my gateway to the rest of the NFL, NBA, and MLB, respectively. Therefore, I haven’t been following the leagues in general very closely. So I’m not comfortable writing posts about why LeBron’s advanced stats are down this year, or, theoretically, why I think Aaron Rodgers is a better quarterback than Ben Roethlisberger.

When we started this website, our intention was to supply fans of Cleveland sports with an outsider’s perspective, one that wasn’t hopelessly tied to a “woe is me” attitude. We all like to feel special. Making yourself out to be the king of losing is one way to do that. Clevelanders, in my opinion, do this spectacularly.

It does not make me fond of them.

Not “them” per se, but rather, their pervading attitude. At Mesa, we’ve tried to be realists since the beginning. I think we’ve done that. Has it mattered? I don’t know. Have we made an impact?

As much as I’d like to say otherwise, I don’t think we have.

Why is this?

Realism isn’t commercially appealing. I know this because I work in the movie business. Narratives that sell to mass audiences aren’t based on what we know is true but rather on what we want to believe is true (and I’m paraphrasing William Goldman when I say that). Moreover, these stories need to be wrapped in tight little packages with just enough of a twist so that they feel different - but can still be consumed in a familiar fashion.

What I’m saying, essentially, in this admittedly somewhat rambling post, is that Mesa is an indie movie screening for a city full of people who were hoping to see TRANSFORMERS 3.

What does it all mean?

I have a few ideas … but if anyone else is out there, I’d be curious to hear what you think.

Anthony Parker Trade Scenarios

Thu, 03 Feb 2011 22:00:06 -0800

Rumors surfaced this week that Chicago’s front office has registered serious trade interest in Anthony Parker, contingent on the health of his back. The outlines of a deal aren’t in place, so there’s no indication of compensation on the Cavs’ side yet. But since all I think about with the Cavs nowadays are trades, I figured I would spend some time trying to figure out what would be realistic for Chris Grant to get back in an A.P. swap.

Ironically, the Cavs are still dealing with the same trade dynamic they’ve been dealing with for the past few seasons. They just happen to be on the opposite side of it. Contenders are now looking to the Cavs to supply key role players that can help push their nucleus to the next level.

Of course, the hitch is that the contending teams want to give up relatively little to acquire that key role player. They’re also generally pretty asset-light. Their rosters are normally stocked with stars, veterans, and a few developmental young players on contracts complicated by Base Year Compensation rules. In short, even if they were willing to be generous, contending teams often don’t even have many of the assets a rebuilding team wants. Chicago is no different.

Let’s clear this up immediately: there are basically no actual Bulls players that the Cavs would both really want and likely be able to acquire. Taj Gibson (the anti-Glitch, as far as I can tell) is a significant contributor averaging about 23 minutes per game; Chicago’s not giving him up. Omer Asik could possibly be available, but he’s a base year player and thus difficult to incorporate into a deal. Plus, the Cavs already have one developmental 7’ center in CSKA Moscow’s Sasha Kaun. They’d be better served in trying to fill the other myriad holes in the roster.

That leaves James Johnson as the only available young gun on the Bulls’ bench who could fit. He’s no longer on a base year deal. He plays a position of need (SF). But unfortunately, he’s been back and forth to the D-League this year, and his numbers in the majors have not been impressive.

In light of all that, the only appealing offer for Chris Grant revolves around the draft. Chicago still owns their 2011 and 2012 first-round picks. They also hold a future first rounder from Charlotte, but I assume they’d be more prepared to deal one of their own first-round picks than the Charlotte pick because of likely draft order. Meanwhile, Chicago’s second-rounder in both 2011 and 2012 is owed to Milwaukee.

Theoretically then, the best scenario for the Cavs is to demand one of Chicago’s next two first-round picks as the centerpiece of the trade.

After mulling it over, I think Chicago’s front office can justify that pay-out. Right now the Bulls conservatively project to have one of the top five records in basketball, meaning their 2011 first-rounder will be #26 at best. The incoming draft class is weak by most accounts I’ve seen, and the danger of a lock-out grows by the day. With Parker as another serious three point threat to pair with Kyle Korver, the Bulls become a championship-level team with minimal sacrifice.

On top of the “basketball reasons” for the Bulls to pull the trigger, Parker’s status as walking salary relief adds to his trade value. His $2.9M salary comes off the books at the end of this season. This gives the Cavs some bargaining power, as keeping Parker would have clear benefits and should force the Bulls into sweetening the deal with a pick they may not otherwise want to include.

So what’s the likely trade? I can see two possibilities. One would be A.P. for Chicago’s 2011 #1, James Johnson, and Brian Scalabrine. In that case, the Cavs get Johnson as a low-risk project ($1.7M this year, with team options for the next two at about $1.8M each). They would likely buy out Scalabrine’s one-year veteran minimum contract, thereby saving some cash and allowing Scal to return to the end of the Bulls’ bench before the playoffs as an even more translucent version of early 2000s Mark Madsen.

The other possibility would be for the Cavs to replace Johnson in the deal above with Keith Bogans ($1.6M). This is the cleaner deal for the Bulls, since Bogans and Parker play the same position and roughly the same quantity of minutes. Having both players on the roster would be redundant. Bogans (career 107 Defensive Rating) is a slightly better defender than Parker (career 109 Defensive Rating), but not nearly the dead-eye from distance (35% 3P career to Parker’s 41.2% 3P career). The Bulls can live with any minor defensive drop-off to gain the serious bump in firepower.

For the Cavs, there’s little difference between the two versions of the deal. Both are a wash from a financial standpoint. Bogans’s contract for next year is a non-guaranteed $1.73M—basically identical to the $1.8M team option on James Johnson’s contract. Scalabrine would be bought out in either scenario. Bogans would probably do more for the Cavs’ quest to avoid the worst record in NBA history, whereas Johnson has more potential for the future.

But in all likelihood, neither player matters. At their cores, both versions of the deal amount to a 40% off sale on a first-round pick. (The established going rate for straight-up selling a first-rounder is $3M.) Hardly inspiring when defined that way, but still a net positive for the Cavs.

None of this matters if Parker’s back gives out again in the next two weeks, or if a third team gets involved. But if a deal does materialize strictly between the Cavs and Bulls, the over-arching point is that it’s not going to alter the Cavs’ immediate future in a significant way. However, the asset stockpile will grow, and that’s about all we can ask for at this point.

-T

Did Holmgren Do What the Steelers and Packers Did?

Wed, 02 Feb 2011 23:13:44 -0800

Did Holmgren Do What the Steelers and Packers Did?:

Short post for me tonight, regrettably. But here is a link to a very good article, as usual, by Michael Lombardi that discusses the Packers and the Steelers most recent head coaching hires - more specifically, neither organization’s desire to “win the press conference.”

It seems to me that Mike Holmgren followed a lot of these same principles when hiring Pat Shurmur to be the Browns newest head coach.

Personally, I am always in favor of a decision that comes without a desire to win the press conference … but, in that case, I really wonder why Holmgren didn’t remove Mangini last season. Because if Holmgren believes in the principles Lombardi discusses in this article, then the notion of Mangini being the appropriate head coach for this organization seems deeply misguided.

Return of the Double Standard

Wed, 02 Feb 2011 01:13:39 -0800

I watched last Thursday’s “Inside the NBA” over the weekend. During the course of the broadcast, I was reminded of something that I’m sure we noted at the beginning of this season (though I’m not going to spend the time trying to dig back into our archives and prove it).

Essentially, TNT’s studio team was lauding Boston’s play and discussing what a tough out they’ll be in the playoffs this spring. One of the essential components of their argument: just think of what they’ll be able to do when they have a healthy Shaquille O’Neal back on the court.

Whomever made this point was greeted with a loud round of agreement. Shaq was indeed going to be a handful in the post-season.

Compare this to the reaction of NBA analysts last year when The Big Aristotle was in a Cavs uniform. All we heard about during that time was how old Shaq had gotten, how he’d lost several steps, how he didn’t have any lift, couldn’t be depended on to deliver in a major way during the playoffs, etc.

However, with his 38th birthday looming in 34 days, Shaq has somehow been thrown into some kind of analyst rejuvenation machine. Somehow, by putting on a different uniform, he has once again become a force to be reckoned with.

I’ll admit that I haven’t been paying as much attention to the league as a whole this season as I have in previous years. My sense from what I had seen up to today was that Shaq was largely doing the same things in the same quantities with Boston as what he did for the Cavs last year. But in the interest of fairness, I decided to check the numbers tonight to be sure.

Here’s what I found:

2009-10 Shaq Vs. 2010-11 Shaq

Games Played: 53 Vs 35

Minutes Per Game: 23.4 Vs 20.9

FGA per 36 min: 13.4 Vs 9.6

FG%: 56.6 Vs 66.7

FTA per 36 min: 6.6 Vs 6.4

FT%: 49.6 Vs 55.8

Offensive Rebound %: 9.4 Vs 8.8

Defensive Rebound %: 24.0 Vs 20.2

Total Rebound %: 17.0 Vs 14.8

Assist %: 11.3 Vs 5.8

Turnover %: 15.7 Vs 17.1

Offensive Rating (Points scored per 100 possessions): 104 Vs 113

Defensive Rating (Points allowed per 100 possessions): 102 Vs 98

Fouls: 4.9 Vs 5.8

In summary, Boston Shaq shoots a much higher percentage from the floor and a slightly less terrible percentage from the stripe; is no better at getting to the line; rebounds worse (particularly defensively); assists about half as much; turns the ball over more frequently; and fouls more often than Cleveland Shaq, with a negligible difference in minutes per game (-2.5 this season).

So while his offensive rating has improved noticeably, and his defensive rating somewhat, the category by category breakdown suggests that this is not a dramatically different player than he was a year ago. Even the current upticks in his offensive and defensive ratings are likely to settle before the end of the season. Case in point: in his last 4 games, Shaq has totaled 10 points…combined.

This isn’t a column meant to bag on Shaq, who I still root for on an individual level. The point is that, once again, the same phenomenon can look a whole lot different to the sports media depending on whether it’s happening in the TD Banknorth Garden instead of The Q. Some things never change.

-T

The 4-3 Defense and the Princeton Offense

Tue, 01 Feb 2011 05:00:06 -0800

Tim, myself, and @joshrosen had an illuminating, albeit brief, conversation on Twitter Sunday night regarding the Browns’ apparent switch to a 4-3 Defense.

Ever since the possibility of this transformation came up, I’ve been asking myself a simple but important question.

Why?

Why do the Browns want to become a 4-3 Defense?

Is the 4-3 Defense more effective than the 3-4 Defense they have been running?

Does Pat Shurmur only understand how to coach a 4-3 Defense?

Does Tom Heckert only know how to supply players for a 4-3 Defense?

What, really, is the point?

This is a crucial question because obviously the two kinds of defenses need different types of personals. In the simplest terms, the 4-3 needs one more starting end than the 3-4. The 3-4 needs one more starting linebacker than the 4-3.

This means that a personnel overhaul is coming. Free agents will be signed. Draft picks will be used. Trades could be made.

And for what?

If the 4-3 was really more effective than the 3-4, you would think that the two teams competing in the Super Bowl this Sunday would be deploying it.

They are not.

The Browns had a bunch of weaknesses already. Now they have one more - defensive players who are not suited for the 4-3.

If Pat Shurmur only knows how to coach a 4-3, I’m not sure what to say. As a former Offensive Coordinator, ostensibly, he should understand both types of defenses. And since there isn’t going to be an Offensive Coordinator on this coaching staff at all, I don’t see how Shurmur will have any time to spend on the defense as is.

So what was it? Heckert can figure out 3-4 personnel, can’t he? He did so last year. Was Dick Jauron such a can’t miss hire that the Browns had to have him - and Jauron, we know, has a history coaching the 4-3?

This seems unlikely since they did, after all, interview other candidates.

When Tim, Josh, and I were exchanging messages about this, Tim made what I thought was a great point: “Any time a coach preferentially imposes a system w/o considering strengths of his personnel it is mistake.”

While I would hesitate to use the “always” that is buried implicitly inside of Tim’s tweet, I largely agree. If a coach is going to demand his team play a certain style or within a specific system that runs counter to the personnel he was given he better make a compelling argument for why.

Here, in Cleveland, we’re watching this movie already. Byron Scott came in and kicked out Mike Brown’s offensive and defensive systems, simply for the sake of his own familiarity. Sure, Scott has had success running the vaunted Princeton Offense before, but he did so with superstar point guards Chris Paul and Jason Kidd at the helm. A carbon copy of either one of those two point guards is not on this team.

So, I ask, what was the point of installing a new system? Because Scott liked the Princeton Offense more?

This is a classic mistake by upper management. We all have our preferences, but our preferences must serve a purpose or they won’t be effective at anything beyond making ourselves feel more comfortable.

Which, when your job is winning games, shouldn’t really be at the top of the priority list.

Ultimately, changing systems means re-education and changing personnel - and it probably means some amount of regression. In the case of the Cavs, this has actually worked out well, since it is better for the organization in the long run that the team is tanking this badly this quickly.

When it comes to the Browns, however, another year of regression is unacceptable. Otherwise, why bother firing Eric Mangini if you’re just planning on getting worse anyway?

You don’t. You fire Mangini to get better. And there is reason to wonder if switching to the 4-3 will make getting better in 2011 at least slightly more difficult for the Cleveland Browns.

Colt Vs Kolb

Sun, 30 Jan 2011 22:00:06 -0800

Adam Schefter is reporting that the Philadelphia Eagles have decided to franchise Mike Vick and trade Kevin Kolb.

More importantly to us, sources are listing the Browns as one of the teams potentially interested in trading for him.

You’re not going to find a bigger proponent than me of the notion that until your NFL team has a quarterback, they’re just not important. You’re also not going to find anyone more unsure than me about whether or not Colt McCoy is the real deal at the position.

Then why am I adamantly opposed to the possibility of Holmgren & Company dealing for Kolb? Two simple reasons.

First, by almost every statistical category I’ve checked, McCoy was better than Kolb last season. From our friends at Advanced NFL Stats:

2010 COLT McCOY vs. KEVIN KOLB

Games played: 8 vs. 7

Win Probability Added: -0.18 vs -1.02

Expected Points Added: 16.5 vs 4.4

Completion %: 60.8 vs 60.8

Pass Yards per Game: 197 vs 171

INT per Game: 1.125 vs 1.0

% of Pass Attempts Over 15 yards: 20.3 vs 19.6

Adjusted Yards Per Attempt: 4.2 vs 3.8

In summary: McCoy played one more game than Kolb last season, but apart from throwing .125 more interceptions per game, was as good or better in every way.

I would highlight Completion Percentage, Percentage of Pass Attempts over 15 yards, and Adjusted Yards per Attempt in this comparison, because they illustrate that McCoy and Kolb are both West Coast style quarterbacks. In other words, both are equally well-suited toward the type of O that Pat Shurmur is going to run.

Add to the above that we were bombarded with report after report about McCoy’s leadership ability and presence in the huddle as a rookie, and I just don’t see a logical argument for the idea that Kolb is a superior quarterback.

This leads us to the second reason that I’m against the idea of a trade: compensation. If memory serves, the Eagles are supposedly asking for multiple picks, including at least one first rounder, for Kolb. The Browns need talent all over the field, with the possible exception of RB and the center to left side of the O line. Given that reality, shipping off multiple picks in order to acquire a quarterback who is not markedly better than your incumbent seems like about as good an idea as wearing capri pants to a UAW bar.

So while I’m not yet sold on McCoy, I hope the Browns brain / mustache trust recognizes that they need a talented, deep draft class more than they need another unproven quarterback.

-T

Boobie Gibson and the Oklahoma Thunder

Fri, 28 Jan 2011 05:12:07 -0800

The last time the Oklahoma City Thunder were on national television, I remarked on Twitter that I would not be able to take them seriously as a contender until they could make for than 5 threes a game (good for 28th in the league).

I wrote this because I’m a big believer in the impact the 3P shot has on offensive efficiency. When your team can shoot well from behind the arc, not only does it lead to more points on fewer shots, it also spreads the floor. Statistically, as Kevin Pelton at Basketball Prospectus has illustrated, 3P shooters have a positive effect on a team’s offense.

Hence my logic regarding OKC.

But then I discovered that the Thunder are currently ranked 6th in the NBA in Offensive Efficiency.

So what gives?

Namely, free throws.

Oklahoma City is 1st in the NBA in FT% at 83.1%. Portland is 2nd - 3.4% behind.

The Thunder are also 2nd in Free Throw Rate, or the number of free throws attempted per the number of field goals attempted.

What this means effectively is that the Thunder could be a dominant offense with one or two good to great three point shooters.

In other words, Daniel Gibson, OKC GM Sam Presti has probably said your name at some point over the past few weeks to Chris Grant.

Boobie is taking 6.0 3P attempts per 40 minutes and making 2.7 of them, which is good for 44.9%. On the Thunder, Boobie would be the best 3P shooter by far. Of the players who play regular minutes, James Harden is #1 from 3P at 37.8%.

So then, if you’re Chris Grant, and Presti calls you about Daniel Gibson, what do you think you can get for him? Would you move Boobie and Anthony Parker to OKC for Eric Maynor and James Harden? Probably. Would Presti give away two young players for one guy in his prime and one guy at the end of his career? Probably not. Could you get either Maynor or Harden though?

Who knows. I don’t. But I am pretty confident that Gibson could help the Thunder on both ends of the floor - although he would hurt their FT shooting a bit (only 82.2% this year).

Let's Make a Deal. (Please, I'm Begging.)

Thu, 27 Jan 2011 00:33:18 -0800

Like a lot of other Cleveland sports junkies, I grow a little more frustrated every day by the Cavs. However, I’m no longer talking about the record or the lack of defense. I’m not talking about the players. I’m not even talking about the infallible Byron Scott (for once).

I’m talking about the front office.

Clearly, the team isn’t going to turn things around. At this point they’ll be lucky to avoid the worst record in modern NBA history. But I worry, because I have seen nothing in weeks that indicates the front office has accepted this unavoidable reality.

Mike and I have already argued on this blog for months that the best possible move is for the Cavs to declare the present a total loss and do anything they can to prepare for the future. By now, we’re certainly not alone, and it’s no longer a revolutionary opinion (if it ever was).

Yet every day I check for Cavs’ trade rumors, and every day I come up empty.

So for all the talk about the need to collect assets and build through the draft, I have no real evidence that the front office is making overtures to try to do that. And if they’re not, I cannot for the life of me imagine why. Because at this point, that’s their only function besides scouting the NCAA and Euroleagues—making this team worse now (and better later) by pawning off any semi-valuable players to contenders at the highest possible price.

Other people have written about how Dan Gilbert’s near-psychotic need to win faster than LeBron has already hindered the rebuilding process. The argument is that after being humiliated by James, Gilbert convinced himself that the Cavs should try to compete for the playoffs this year as a way of saving face.

Of course, I don’t have behind-the-scenes knowledge of what’s going on in the owner’s box, but I suspect that there’s a good deal of truth to this theory. All you have to do is realize that whatever the Cavs could’ve gotten for Andy over the summer would’ve been better than what they can get for him for the rest of this season, which is basically nothing.

The real problem is that I now fear that Gilbert will try to save face by holding onto would-be “stars” like Jamison and Mo in hopes of avoiding the worst record ever—without realizing that those big(ger) names are directly contributing to the reasons the team is losing as much as it is. (To prove Byron Scott is either a hypocrite, out of options, or out of touch, consider that Jamison is averaging 31.3mpg this season despite Scott’s insistence that only players who will lock down on defense will see playing time. Watching Jamison try to D up reminds me of that moment in every ghost movie where someone or something passes directly through the body of a specter and leaves all witnesses amazed and terrified.)

I admit that just because I’m not seeing rumors on the web doesn’t mean that talks aren’t happening behind closed doors. The Cavs’ case is also hurt by injuries to some of their more tradeable assets: Andy out for the season, Mo having only appeared in 34 games because of nagging ailments.

But between now and the trading deadline (which is only a month away), I sincerely hope to see strong evidence that Chris Grant and company are working the phones like mad to try to get what they can for what they have. If they’re not—or if Gilbert’s ego is holding them back in any way—this rebuilding process is going to be as delayed and bumpy as major real-world construction projects so often are. Having been up close and personal with one of those for a number of years, I hope for the city’s and the fan base’s sake that none of us have to suffer through that.

-T

Competition and the Popularity of Pro Sports

Wed, 26 Jan 2011 05:24:53 -0800

In yesterday’s post, Tim wrote some things that I didn’t wholeheartedly agree with (it happens from time to time). I’m overgeneralizing a bit, but his argument was essentially that, of the three major professional sports, the NFL is the most friendly to small market teams, citing competitive balance as his measuring stick.

There are, of course, different ways to gauge competitive balance. The easiest way - which doesn’t necessarily make it the best way - is to look at the number of different teams that have won championships over an extended period of time.

In the past thirty years then (since 1980), here is the breakdown:

NBA: 8 champions
NFL: 15 champions
MLB: 19 champions

As you can see, Major League Baseball - despite Tim’s assertion that its system is “out of whack” - has produced the most different champions of any of the three professional sports.

Admittedly, MLB, NBA, and NFL have gone through multiple collective bargaining agreements over this time period. MLB’s revenue sharing system has been in place since the year 2000. In those 11 years, there have been 9 different World Series Champions.

Not bad.

In relation to this, I thought it was worth looking at some poll numbers CNBC’s sports business reporter Darren Rovell tweeted earlier today. Here are the favorite sports amongst US fans, according to SportsBusiness Journal and Daily:

NFL: 31%
MLB: 17%
College Football: 12%
Auto Racing: 7%
NBA: 6%

These numbers suggest that competitive balance - as measured by percentage chance your favorite team has of winning the championship - probably has some significance when it comes to the favorite sports of Americans.

There are obviously other factors to consider, as well. Tim commented on the notion that MLB and its season, which consists of 162 3 hour games, doesn’t fit with the speed of life in the 21st century. I would agree. That may be why, according to Rovell via Harris Interactive, MLB has had the greatest drop in popularity over the past 25 years (a 6% decline).

On the contrary, America’s most popular sport, the NFL, has only 16 games in its regular season, all of which are played on the same two days of the week, each weekend, for 17 weeks (minus the odd Thursday night games). This implies that the NFL necessitates a time commitment that is right in line with what the country is willing to give. Needless to say, the NBA and its 82 game season full of 2 and a half hour games isn’t much better than baseball … except for the fact, maybe, that a large portion of the NBA season occurs during the winter when there is less to do outside in most parts of the country.

Race, I would argue, is another factor in all of this, albeit one that is less spoken about. There is certainly a school of thought that says black, tattooed basketball players - the most visible of all the pro athletes - project an image that not all white sports fans are comfortable with.

And we can’t forget the games themselves. Football has a lot of dead space, maybe as much as baseball. Possibly more. Definitely more than basketball. But when the action starts it is typically fast, violent, and unpredictable. The bar culture - and NFL Sunday Ticket - which allows people to go to one place and watch all of the games … and all of the players on their fantasy teams … simultaneously is another boon to pro football.

Side note: college football would be smart to emulate this program by allowing fantasy football, which to my knowledge, they do not.

Ultimately, I think we have to acknowledge that winning championships - and the notion of competitive balance - may not be the be all end all for the majority of sports fans in America. An easy to watch sport, without an excruciating time commitment - event programming, if you will - may be the biggest advantage of all, especially since the NFL can have an equally simplistic fantasy component that allows some of that competitive spirit to be transferred directly to the fan.

After all, might it be more compelling to see if YOU will beat your friends in fantasy football than to see if some guys you don’t know but root for anyway beat some other guys you don’t know but choose to root against?

I think it might.

NFL: the Official League of Non-Major Markets(?)

Tue, 25 Jan 2011 02:20:15 -0800

Yesterday, Mike made an excellent point about what dark clouds the new NBA free agent circus may hold for small-to-mid-market franchises. His conclusion syncs up nicely with something I’ve been thinking about since the end of the Browns season.

The question is this: Is it possible that in a few years, the NFL will be the only sustainable pro sport in non-major markets, i.e. the only one where cities like Cleveland can legitimately hope to compete for a title?

Based on the available evidence, I believe the answer may be ‘yes.’

I’ve considered a few crucial differences between the NBA and NFL in this regard. I’ve ignored Major League Baseball because their system is currently so far out of wack—see: the complete lack of a salary cap—that it hardly seems worth addressing. (Let alone that MLB’s largest problem is that almost no one in contemporary American life wants to watch 162 regular season games that last 3.5+ hours each.)

Unless the parameters change in the new CBA, rookie contracts will be one major determinant of the answer. The current rules dictate that a player drafted in the first half of the first round can be signed to a 6-year contract; players in the second half of the first round to a 5-year contract; and players after the first round to a 4-year contract. (Thanks to Ask the Commish for the details.)

The contrast with the NBA is evident immediately. For first-round picks, the longest contract a team can extend is 4 years, with the latter 2 years both existing as team options. If a contract extension isn’t worked out by the end of the 4th year, the team can put forth a qualifying offer for a 5th year—but that only makes the player a restricted free agent. Further, if the player decides to play out the 5th year, he obtains veto power over any trades, then becomes an unrestricted free agent the following summer. (Thanks to Hoopsworld for the low-down.)

Perhaps counter-intuitively, NBA second round picks gain leverage even faster than their first-round cohorts. The longest contract an NBA team will normally negotiate here is 2-years of nonguaranteed money. However, if a second round pick pans out in a major way, he’s free to test the market as quickly as his sophomore, or at worst, junior season in the league.

The end result of this comparison? Current NFL rules protect their franchises by providing longer guarantees for potential star players than their NBA counterparts.

Consider the following: In 2010, the St. Louis Rams signed Sam Bradford to a 6-year contract. Meanwhile, LeBron was a Cav for only 7 total seasons: 4 on his rookie contract, another 3 thanks to an extension.

This example is one where simple subtraction simply doesn’t tell the story. Yes, we’re only talking about a net 1 year difference between the Rams’ agreement with Bradford and the Cavs’ two agreements with LeBron. But the difference is continuity. After going 7-9 and barely missing the playoffs in his rookie season, the Rams’ front office knows that Bradford is a franchise player that they have for the next 5 seasons, guaranteed. As we all know too well, the Cavs didn’t have such a long-term safety net. Instead, they allowed themselves to be forced into a series of panic upgrades that were never conducive to a strong, long-term foundation.

The reason was obvious: LeBron’s free agency was always pending, so they had to prove they could win now in order to keep him around. The Rams, meanwhile, have half a decade to build around Bradford.

The contrast carries through the lower branches of each sport’s draft: by the time a second round NFL pick can become a free agent, a second round NBA pick will have had the free agency option two or even three years earlier.

All of this plays into the viability of pro football versus pro basketball in cities like Cleveland. As proven by LeBron and Chris Bosh, young NBA stars are no longer prone to take slightly more money to stay with the franchise that drafted them. Their desire to build “super teams” is hardly surprising, given the (Mesa favorite) fact that only 8 different NBA franchises have won the title in the past 30 years.

But young NFL stars are basically locked into their first franchise for a substantial time period from the starting gun. With a skillful personnel department, NFL teams have the time they need to convince budding stars to stick around via complementary moves. Given the numbers, those players also have less incentive to migrate to specific alternatives than their NBA counterparts anyway; in the same 30 year period, 14 different NFL teams have won the Super Bowl.

These rookie contract considerations aren’t the only elements that empower small-to-mid-market NFL teams. Their ability to “franchise” a player otherwise ready to hit the open market is another powerful tool in the quest for competitive balance.

For the uninitiated, the franchise tag essentially blocks a player at the end of his contract from entering free agency. If he’s hit with an exclusive franchise tag, the player cannot negotiate with other teams, but is compensated by receiving one year’s salary equal to either the average of the top 5 salaries at his position in the current NFL season, or 120% of his previous contract year, whichever is greater. If he’s hit with a non-exclusive franchise tag, the player is compensated by receiving either the average of the top 5 salaries at his position in the previous NFL season, or 120% of his previous contract year, whichever is greater.

However, non-exclusive franchise players also maintain the right to negotiate with other teams. If they sign an offer sheet elsewhere, the original franchise has the right to match the offer, or else refuse it and receive two first-round draft picks from the franchise player’s chosen destination. In comparison to the NBA equivalent, this system is vastly preferable to any franchise unable to maintain a star player. Two first rounders in the NFL draft is a HUGE bounty. By contrast, the best an NBA team can do when a star chooses to go elsewhere is normally a few infinitely less valuable future draft picks and a trade exception. (We can all see how much that trade exception has helped the Cavs this season.)

If all of the above weren’t enough, also consider the prevalence of undrafted NFL free agents or late round picks not only making an NFL roster, but becoming impact players. (Peter King examines this phenomenon briefly in his most recent Monday Morning Quarterback - just scroll down to “The [Super Bowl] match-up is a reward to two organizations that built teams.”) The probability of a second round pick or undrafted NBA free agent having the same kind of effect on a team’s fortune seems to be much rarer—and again, even when it does happen, the team that took a chance on the player in question almost immediately has to work to try to retain his services.

Admittedly, I have no idea what the new NBA and NFL collective bargaining agreements will look like. However, if current rules and current trends largely remain, then I sincerely believe that we are rapidly approaching a time when the NFL is the only legitimate game in town for cities like Cleveland. Here’s hoping I’m dead wrong.

-T

Why Is It Okay to Talk About Carmelo?

Mon, 24 Jan 2011 05:44:24 -0800

I’d be surprised if there is a single person out there reading this who is not sick and tired of hearing about the Carmelo Anthony trade talks. Include me in that mix.

So why the hell am I writing about it?

Good question. Here is my explanation:

You may remember that during the lead up to LeBron James’s free agency, the NBA doled out multiple fines for team officials who dared to speak about James before July 1st. The NBA took a hard stance that mentioning LeBron’s name would qualify as tampering.

Recalling the fines that Mark Cuban and Steve Kerr were hit with the other day got me thinking…

Why the hell is Mikhail Prokhorov, the majority owner of the New Jersey Nets, allowed to openly discuss trading for Anthony at a press conference ?

Furthermore, why is Carmelo allowed to talk about being traded on almost a daily basis? Players consistently get fined for talking about trades, as well. Sometimes they even get fined when their agents talk about being traded.

In my opinion, this strange turn in the NBA’s handling of public conversations about trades and players that are under contract with other teams signals one thing:

David Stern watched what LeBron did for the league by implicitly courting a consortium of other teams from 2007-2010. Stern watched what all of the player movement this past offseason did to hype the league entering opening night. He understands that it is free marketing. And Stern is now prepared to encourage it.

This is a bad thing for fans who prefer rooting for one team over taking a casual interest in the NBA in general. It suggests, to me, that Bird Rights - which were created as a means of encouraging players to stay on one team for the length of their careers - are on their way out in the new collective bargaining agreement. And, if indeed this happens, then it also quite possibly means the end of good basketball in second and third tier markets.

Basketball is a superstar driven sport, more than any other. The lack of real superstars in the league contributes to the lack of parity, or competitive balance, or whatever you prefer to call it. Without Bird Rights this will only get worse. For fans who enjoy clinging on to one team and one team only, be ready for a bumpy ride.

LeBron really has changed everything.

The Problem with Pace

Fri, 21 Jan 2011 01:56:00 -0800

Another day of the NBA season, another update on the continuing downward spiral of the 2010-11 Cavs.

Wayne Winston of adjusted plus/minus fame released his latest weighted NBA efficiency ratings yesterday. The Cavs are now even more firmly cemented in last place than before. Overall, their Winston-calculated efficiency differential has plummeted to a knee-buckling -10.41 points per 100 possessions.

The last time I checked this same stat, the gap between Byron Scott’s squad and the 29^th place Sacramento Kings was a depressing -3 points per 100 possessions. As of today, that gap has widened to nearly 5 points per 100 possessions, as the Kings’ weighted differential clocks in at -5.86.

In other words, the Cavs—by Winston’s statistical measure, anyway—have gotten 67% worse in the past week.

Admittedly, this has to do with the fact that Winston’s ratings are heavily weighted based on recent performance, and having a 55 point loss in your recent past is a recipe for disaster on that front.

I just checked Hoop Data for the raw efficiency differential, hoping for some kind of silver lining. Guess what? The Cavs’ unadjusted efficiency differential is even worse. They trail the rest of the league at -12.1 points per 100 possessions. Salt in the wound: they trail the Kings (-7.5) by almost exactly the same margin here as in Winston’s adjusted rankings.

This seems like it should only be able to take place in a parallel universe. And yet, here we are: at a point where it’s indisputable that the 2010-11 Cavs can neither defend nor score.

However, they’re running. According to Hoop Data, they now rank 12^th in the league in pace—dangerously close to surpassing the “average” zone and being considered “up-tempo.”

Herein lies the problem, though. John Krolik of Cavs: The Blog pointed out earlier this week (thanks to some time spent on Synergy) that Byron Scott’s Cavs score fewer points on transition opportunities than any other team in the league.

So yes, the team is getting out in transition. But they’re terrible at scoring in transition, so it’s not helping them to run.

In fact, it may be hurting them.

Consider this: if you equate “fast” with “good,” then pace is potentially the only category in which the Cavs have shown steady progress this season. But as their pace has increased, their efficiency differential has plummeted—and their record alongside it.

In other words, the available evidence suggests that speeding up the tempo makes the Cavs less efficient and therefore, less likely to win.

Byron Scott does appear to be holding up one end of his introductory presser by forcing the Cavs to be a running team. But this raises the question: should they be one? Is that where their strengths (I use that term loosely) lie? Or would the team be better served by slowing the pace down and conserving some energy for defense?

With all the injuries and the psychological weight of so much losing, it may be a moot point. To me, though, a coach worth his paycheck would investigate this idea, especially after losing 24 of the team’s last 25 games. (Or whatever the actual number is. At this point, it hardly warrants the time needed to fact-check.)

Instead, Scott seems committed to trying to keep the pedal to the floor. But with only a month before the All-Star break and over a month since the Cavs’ league-low 8^th win, it’s entirely possible that Scott is simply speeding his way toward the worst season in NBA history.

-T

A Simple Question About Offensive Coordinators

Wed, 19 Jan 2011 21:57:00 -0800

This is a simple question, really, from a very tired and overworked young man.

Should anyone on the planet be surprised the Browns haven’t been able to hire an Offensive Coordinator yet?

I don’t think so.

Why?

Because who wants to be an Offensive Coordinator on a team where they aren’t even going to get to call the plays?

Even better, the guy calling the plays instead is a rookie Head Coach.

Even better still, the guy calling the plays is a rookie Head Coach with only two years of experience as an Offensive Coordinator.

For the St. Louis Rams.

This remains one of the strangest things about the Shurmur hire, frankly.

Why did Mike Holmgren feel the need to accept the idea of Shurmur calling his own plays?

In my mind, this looks like a categorically terrible idea. Shurmur has never been a Head Coach in the NFL before. What is the point of giving him play calling duties when he is already going to have to figure out how to juggle more responsibility than he has ever had before?

Is it because he’s such a remarkable play caller?

I find this hard to believe.

And I’m sure a lot of Offensive Coordinator candidates are asking themselves the same, or similar, questions.

Moreover, even if an Offensive Coordinator were comfortable with the idea of coordinating an offense for which they do not call the plays - what this would entail, I’m not quite sure - they would have to be relatively uncomfortable with the notion that they have almost no chance of promotion. You don’t get a head coaching job by being an Offensive Coordinator and not calling the plays.

The person who calls the plays gets all of the credit.

Does taking a job that someone else will get all of the credit for sound like a good idea to you?

It doesn’t to me.

It seems then that the Browns will either have to hire someone who is awfully desperate - or they’re just going to have to hire from the very bottom of the barrel, like somebody who’s currently stuck at the junior college or high school level.

Ha.

I’m kidding.

Well, not completely…

Colt McCoy & the Arm Strength Conundrum

Wed, 19 Jan 2011 01:32:35 -0800

Although a lot of Browns fans are excited by the possibility that Colt McCoy could finally be The Guy,a lot of analysts have agreed that there’s a dark shadow hovering over him. People love his leadership. They love his work ethic. They love his intelligence and the way he performed under pressure. But from Tony Grossi onward, the word is that McCoy’s arm strength is “a concern” moving forward.

This notion irritates the hell out of me. Not because I’m blindly onboard with Colt McCoy, but because one of my pet peeves in sports is the tendency for people to believe that as soon as an athlete begins his second year, his strengths and weaknesses are frozen in place. He will never become significantly better at anything than what he already is. It’s as if a timer gets started on the day the athlete is drafted, and as soon as it goes off a couple of years later, the cement has set.

I’ll admit that by and large, huge improvements are not the norm. (Holland, feel free to jump in and drop some knowledge on the remarkable year-to-year consistency in NBA players’ stats.) However, if you’re looking at the right types of athletes, you can find plenty of examples of major strides being made.

For instance, let’s switch sports briefly. Steve Nash’s FT% for 2 of his first 3 years in the NBA was ~82.5%. In year 4, he improved to 88.2% and has never dropped below that rate in the succeeding 11 years. In fact, he’s shot 90% or better in 8 of those 11 years.

Returning to the NFL, Drew Brees showed similarly significant statistical improvement a few years into his professional career. In his first three seasons in the league, Brees’ completion percentages were 55.6%, 60.8%, and 57.6% respectively. In his fourth year, his completion percentage jumped to 65.5%. From year 4 to the present, his average annual completion percentage is 66.5%, and his worst year in that span is a still-impressive 64.3%.

What do these two athletes share in common? They were both undersized. Neither was born with the type of overwhelming athleticism that you’d see in, say, LeBron or Mike Vick. And both are renowned for their incredible hard work and dedication to the game.

All of these characteristics are (supposedly) true of Colt McCoy as well.

However, people may look at FT% in basketball and completion % in the NFL and say that those are somehow different than arm strength. They’re about skill and precision, not brute force. Learned, not innate qualities.

Somehow, arm strength is just regarded as being different.

But this past Monday, NFL correspondent Michael Lombardi wrote a column praising Aaron Rodgers. This, in itself, is not special, as the sports media has now universally agreed that Rodgers is The Next Great Quarterback. Even casual NFL fans have elevated him to elite status. In fact, I’m fairly certain that there are babies all over Wisconsin who have delayed trying to crawl so that they can learn to do Rodgers’s “championship belt” gesture instead.

What makes Lombardi’s column worth mentioning in this context is the following passage:

The one noticeable area of improvement from his time in college to now is his arm strength. He never displayed this type of rocket or the ability to throw the ball from every angle. He had a good arm, now he has a powerful arm. Part of the reason for the increased velocity is that in college he…appeared as if the weight room was for linemen, not quarterbacks. Now he looks like he enjoys the weight room and has made his meek body into one that can take a hit and drive the football.

This officially marks the first time that I have ever seen a respectable NFL analyst make the argument that a quarterback’s arm strength can be significantly improved once he reaches the pro ranks. In other words, thanks to Lombardi, I can now point to a highly regarded expert who shares my opinion that this arm strength conundrum is garbage.

Does this mean that I believe a 90 lb chess champ could transform himself into a guy who can throw a football through a bank vault the way Rodgers can? Not necessarily, no. I think there’s some level of proficiency in a specialized field like this that can’t be acquired artificially. But I do believe that it means a pro athlete can go from being decent at something to being very good to great at that same thing—provided he really, truly goes after it.

Clearly, McCoy has some arm strength already. He wouldn’t have been a 4 year starter at Texas and a third round pick in the NFL (Holmgren’s quarterback-induced hard-on aside) if he didn’t. The question becomes, will he have the dedication and work ethic to make the same types of serious improvements that players like Nash, Brees, and Rodgers have made? If so, the Browns may truly have a solution at the QB spot. If not, then it’s back to the drawing board again.

But for now, take some comfort in the fact that Aaron Rodgers has shown that the arm strength issue is not, in fact, genetic-or-bust.

-T

Holmgren vs. LeBron

Tue, 18 Jan 2011 06:58:24 -0800

In a tweet last week, LeCharles Bentley suggested that there were parallels between Mike Holmgren’s decision to hire Pat Shurmur as head coach of the Cleveland Browns and LeBron James’s decision to leave the Cavaliers for the Miami Heat.

The implication here, of course, is that Holmgren decided a long time ago that Eric Mangini would be fired and that Shurmur would replace him - just like LeBron almost certainly knew he would leave Cleveland for Miami far before July 1st, 2010.

Bentley’s argument then, if I’m interpreting the tweet correctly, is that if people are going to be angry about LeBron’s course of action, they should be equally angry with the path that Holmgren took.

I respect Bentley’s opinion more than any other talking head or radio personality in Cleveland. He offers specific insight about football that only an ex-player can give (as opposed to the gross, watered down generalizations a lot of former jocks toss out). He also has a true point of view. Almost nobody has that. I will choose to distill Bentley’s defining P.O.V. as pro-player / anti-ownership … or pro-worker / anti-management if you prefer to look at it as such.

It follows then that the overarching point Bentley is trying to make is fairly obvious: fans treat players one way and treat management another. When players exercise power they are derided for not being loyal. When ownership exercises power it is applauded for being firm. Fans want disciplinarians as coaches - but would never want their boss to be a disciplinarian.

Overall, I largely agree.

However, with all of that in mind, LeCharles is grabbing at straws by comparing Holmgren with James.

In the case of LeBron, fans of the Cavaliers were going to hate that he left no matter where he went or how he decided to do it. Watching the Cavs play this year, it’s easy to see why. By leaving Cleveland, LeBron very literally removed the joy that once came from watching the Cavaliers. Largely because of LeBron, one rather pleasurable extracurricular activity for Clevelanders … poof. Gone.

Not much fun.

But what angered people even more was their belief that LeBron let his decision to leave Cleveland show up in his performance on the court (read: the Eastern Conference Semifinals). The matter of LeBron having decided years ago that he, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh would team up in Miami was inconsequential - until it had an effect on how he conducted the one aspect of his business that could not be hidden from the fan base.

Anyone who has ever coasted during the last week of elementary school really shouldn’t complain about LeBron’s behavior. The same goes for anyone who didn’t try so hard in Algebra once they were admitted to college, or took the easy way out on difficult tasks during the last two weeks at a job. The only difference between you and LeBron is that millions of people care about his work. Maybe ten or fifteen people at most care about yours.

We could debate whether LeBron has a higher level of responsibility than me or you for a long ass period of time.

We won’t do that now.

Let’s look at Holmgren instead.

It’s hard to see the precise parallels between his situation and LeBron’s, even if we are to assume that Bentley is right and Holmgren decided … before the start of this season? … that Shurmur would be his head coach in 2011.

What impact did that decision have on the product the Browns put on the field in 2010?

Would the team really have won significantly more games with Shurmur than they did with Mangini?

Should fans be insulted that Holmgren “lied” to them, saying he wanted to give Mangini the best shot he could to make things work if he really did not?

If you’re truthfully surprised or actually upset that a pro sports executive, professional athlete, or hell, any person in the public eye lied to you at a press conference or in an interview, then you haven’t been paying attention for much of your adult life.

Ultimately, the notion that both Holmgren and LeBron “played us” may be true - but as far as Holmgren goes, we have to ask, “To what effect?” LeBron’s back room dealings impacted the playoffs and a real chance at a championship. What impact did Holmgren’s scheming have? Is the charge that he wasted this season by keeping Mangini around? Maybe … I’m just not sure the season would have been “found” if Shurmur or anyone else had been the coach instead of Mangini.

Browns Draft Considerations

Sun, 16 Jan 2011 19:40:35 -0800

Browns Draft Considerations:

The link jumps to an excerpt from a book called Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports Are Played and Games Are Won, by Tobias J. Moskowitz and L. Jon Wertheim. The book itself is billed as “Freakonomics for sports.” I just read another excerpt on a different topic in the new issue of Sports Illustrated last night have been really impressed with it so far.

The excerpt in question here is titled “The Curse of the No. 1 Draft Pick.” In it, Moskowitz and Wertheim provide data to support the notion that the best possible move for any NFL team picking in the top 10 is for them to trade down. This seemed like a relevant topic to consider today, as the conference championship match-ups were set while the Browns were busy trying to put together another new coaching staff.

The two strongest parts of Moskowitz’s and Wertheim’s argument are that evidence shows teams wanting to move up pay entirely too highly for the right to do so (in both compensatory picks and salary for their targeted player), and that in each draft class there is only a marginal difference in value between the top 4 players at any given position. In fact, when it’s all said and done, they argue that the first pick in the 2nd round carries more value than the 1st overall pick.

The ideas themselves aren’t necessarily new, but I applaud Moskowitz and Wertheim for using data to make the case. Admittedly, their argument will lose a little of its strength next season—whenever “next season” begins—because a new CBA is almost guaranteed to include a rookie wage scale that reduces the discrepancy between salaries for top picks versus lower picks.

Still, with the Browns holding the sixth pick and fans clamoring for a big name college player to start solving their problems, this study serves as more evidence that the best move for the health of the franchise is to pull a Belichick: Take advantage of an overzealous (probably QB-needy) team to stockpile picks and players, load up with talent at a higher rate than everyone else, and start blowing the doors off over the course of a few years.

You could say that this strategy didn’t work out so well for Belichick today. But keep in mind that the Patriots—who went 14-2 this year—have 3 of the top 34 picks in the next draft because of the strategy Moskowitz and Wertheim suggest as the norm. They can’t win every year, but they are going to continue to be really good for a really long time. That sustainable success is exactly what the Browns need to become relevant again. We’ll find out whether or not they recognize it.

One reason I think they very well may: the other team cited as the greatest champion of this strategy is Andy Reid’s Eagles, AKA Tom Heckert’s and Pat Shurmur’s Eagles. Let’s hope it all stays in the family tree.

-T

Everything Goes In Cycles

Fri, 14 Jan 2011 05:00:06 -0800

Here are two box scores, from two separate Cavaliers games, about 20 years apart.

Cavaliers vs. Lakers

Cavaliers vs. Heat

The first, as all of you can guess, I’m sure, is the Cavs’ 55 point loss to the Lakers from Tuesday.

The second is the Cavs’ 68 point victory over the Miami Heat on December 17, 1991.

This is simply a reminder that, in sports, like in many things, success comes and goes. Players get old. They get hurt. They get traded. Coaches are fired. Owners sell the team. Fans stop buying season tickets. They stop watching games. They stop reading every story ever written about NBA basketball.

This is the natural cycle of things. The Cavs will, barring a true catastrophe, be back. We just don’t know how long it will take. But if it’s 20 years then so be it. I have a pretty good idea that in that time, somewhere, the Browns time will come. Or the Indians will win a division or two. Maybe both the Browns and the Indians will compete for a championship. Who knows. In Cleveland, at least, we have three teams to go through the cycle.

That’s better than some places.

Like Columbus.