November 30, 2010
Cavs-Celtics Bazooka Point

This isn’t going to be an in-depth post because there’s a very simple truth at the core of tonight’s game.

In short, the Celtics are a much better team than the Cavs in basically every aspect. The final score, 106-87, is about what it should be.

Yes, the Cavs beat the Celtics at the Q to start the season. But I don’t think anyone believed that success was likely to be repeated in the rematch. The reality is that the Celtics are #2 in the league in Efficiency Differential at +8.3 points per 100 possessions; the Cavs are #26 at minus -5.7. Add those up and the statistic projects that on average the Cavs should lose by 14 points (per 100 possessions). I can’t tell you how many possessions each team used tonight, but I think we can all agree that this game fell within the margin of expectation.

This is especially true when the Cavs give up a staggering 60 points in the paint. For reference, the Cavs scored only 26. If any team since the merger has won a game after being drubbed by 34 points near the rim, I would probably look like I’d seen a ghost.

So in this transitional era, all you can do about a game like tonight’s is forget it and move on. Anyone happen to know who the Cavs are playing next?

-T

November 16, 2010
Cavs / Sixers Bazooka Point

The Cavs managed to return to .500 by shooting down the visiting Seventy-Sixers last night. After an inconsistent first half, they took control in the third quarter and never really looked back.

One area that stuck out to me tonight was perimeter defense. In the first half, the Cavs simply weren’t contesting any shots outside of the paint. Some times it was because of late rotations, other times a seeming unwillingness to close out. The Sixers took advantage of these open mid-range and long-range shots until half time, knocking down 7 of 15 shots outside the paint in the first quarter and 7 of 14 in the second quarter.

However, there was a major course-correction on this front in the second half. For the final 24 minutes, the Cavs seemed to make defending the perimeter—and defending in general—a much higher priority. The second half saw the Sixers take only 17 more shots from outside the paint and connect on only 3 of them (17.6% FG, if you’re keeping track).

On its own, this fact could hide an ugly truth, i.e. the Sixers took fewer shots from outside because the Cavs’ interior D was weak. Thankfully this wasn’t the case. The Cavs were also defensively efficient in the paint in the second half, holding Philly to 7 of 17 there (41.2% FG).

I don’t think it’s a coincidence that Byron Scott benched Glitch about halfway through the third quarter and kept him there for the rest of the game. He was getting consistently lit up for most of the first half. But with Joey Graham and Jamison as the front line, the vise started to tighten. And boy, is that a sentence I never expected to write.

Overall, the Sixers shot only 43.0% for the game and managed only 93 points. I would love to give you the defensive efficiency numbers, but Hoop Data’s advanced stat box scores haven’t yet been posted for last night’s games as I’m writing this. But the strong defense complemented a more fluid offense—28 assists leading to 37 overall FGs and 8 of 20 three-pointers (40% 3FG)—to create a relatively complete game for the team.

They’ll have their work cut out for them with back-to-back road games against New Orleans and San Antonio this weekend, but better for them to head into those games with a little momentum. We’ll see how they hold up in comparison to some of the league’s best on Friday and Saturday.

-T

November 11, 2010
Cavs-Nets Bazooka Point, Deja Vu Edition

Even though I missed tonight’s game, I still feel qualified to comment on one critical aspect of the loss.

Two Cavs players suffered injuries of varying intensity during the game: Mo Williams and Andy Varejao. Mo suffered a right adductor (groin) strain, and Andy suffered some bruised ribs. Mo had to leave the game for good in the third quarter, but Varejao returned with a compression shirt and continued to play.

I’ve read three different recaps of the game, and in each one, Mo’s injury is treated as the devastating one.

This is exactly backwards.

We here at Mesa have been champions of Anderson for as long as the blog has been running. Instead of a “role player,” as seems to be the conventional label for him, we have seen the second best player on the team in the LeBron era.

Like many other NBA players, Andy simply doesn’t get the credit he deserves because he’s not a scorer. However, he does a host of other things that collectively add up to much more than the value of someone who puts up 16-20 points per game. Above all, he’s a fierce defender—John Hollinger declared him the best defensive 4 in the league in his 2009-10 All Defense Team selection column just a few months ago. This is true not only on an individual level, but from a team standpoint as well. He has been without a doubt the bedrock of the defense for the past several years. 

In addition, Andy is an aggressive rebounder (as we all know) and one of the league’s best finishers at the rim (69% last season, 75% so far in 2010-11).

By contrast, Mo is almost strictly a scorer—and this season especially, not even a very good one. In his 4 games thus far, he’s shooting a dismal 36.2% FG and an even grimmer 14.3% 3FG.

For only the second time in his career, he is also under 80% from the free throw line. However, credit where credit is due: Mo is getting to the line 7.9 times per 36 minutes this season. His previous high? 3.0 FTA per 36.

Admittedly, Mo’s shooting numbers would almost undoubtedly head back toward his career averages as the season continued. But even if they did, there’s one simple element to this equation that we can’t forget: the Cavs have other players comparable to (or potentially better than) Mo Williams. Daniel Gibson has been as productive or more productive  than Mo all season, and if Ramon Sessions can find his bearings and return to his Bucks form, extended minutes for him will be arguably the best thing that could happen to this team’s win percentage.

On the other hand, the Cavs have no players who can make up for an injured Andy—unless Samardo Samuels becomes the steal of this year’s rookie class. Obviously Anderson isn’t damaged as badly as Mo, since he went back in the game after his rib bruising. But being able to stay on the floor and being healthy are two very different things. If Andy’s production drops off significantly (tonight: only 8 points, 5 rebounds, 2 steals, and a -11 in 35 minutes), the Cavs will be hurt far worse by that than by any number of missed minutes by Mo.

Hopefully this won’t be an issue the Cavs have to deal with. If it is, you can bet that their record will suffer. In that case, though, let’s at least make sure that we can all correctly point to the real source of the problem on the injury tip.

-T

May 9, 2010
Game 3 Bazooka Point

Disclaimer: I’m going to be critical of the Cavs on one point, and then I’m going to defend them. Here are a few stats that are going to feed into the criticism:

Game 4: 4-21 3P (19%) , -6 OREB, -14 TRB, -10 pts in paint

Game 3: 5-12 3P (44%), -3 OREB, +15 TRB, +18 pts in paint

Game 2: 4-21 3P (19%), -1 OREB, -10 TRB, +2 pts in paint

Game 1: 4-12 3P (33%), -1 OREB, even TRB, +2 pts in paint

SERIES: 17-66 3P (25.8%), -11 OREB, -9 TRB, +12 pts in paint

Over the regular season, the Cavs averaged 19.3 three-point attempts per game. For the series, they’re averaging 16.5 three-point attempts per game, or about 3 fewer per game. More importantly, their percentage for the series is a dismal 25.8%.(For reference, the league average over the regular season was about 35%. The Cavs’ average was 38%.) So against Boston, the Cavs are shooting significantly fewer threes and having a significantly lower success rate on those fewer attempts.

Are the Celtics doing something to take away the Cavs’ long-distance shooting? Not as far as I can tell. The team as a whole—with the exception of Anthony Parker, a clause I can’t believe I just wrote—has been getting many of the same open looks they’ve been getting all season. They’re just not connecting.

The reality is that one of the things that has made the Cavs so difficult to beat all season is their ability to stretch the floor by shooting and making a high volume of 3s. If that aspect of their game can’t be depended on in the playoffs (and given the number of attempts it doesn’t even look like they’re trying to depend on it), there’s a ripple effect through the entire offense. I would suggest it’s not a coincidence that the only game in the series where the Cavs shot well from behind the arc was the same game where they dominated points in the paint. Why? The fewer long shots the Cavs take (and make), the more the Celtics can sag back into the paint to make things difficult for drivers, posters, and Cavs rebounders.

You’re going to read a lot about the Cavs’ effort level in this game. Their performance on the glass will be one of the main pieces of evidence writers use to make that point. As noted above, the Cavs have won the rebounding battle only once in the four games.  But instead of just saying the Cavs should try harder, I’m going to at least suggest that a part of their problem is that the Celtics don’t have to fear the stretched floor the way the Cavs need them to. This makes defensive rebounding easier for the Celtics for the reasons I mentioned above. It also ends up resulting in forced passes to the interior, turnovers (LeBron had 7 today, by the way), and lower offensive production in the paint.

So when you get down to it, my overall point is this: effort is important. But some of the raw stats of the game that people construe as “lack of effort” might not be there if the Cavs would hit something in the neighborhood of the same number of threes they hit in the regular season.

This leads me into the part where I defend the team.

Overall, the Cavs did not play as poorly as other people would have you believe. They held the Celtics to 44.7% FG and 7.1% 3P (1-14). They drew four more fouls on the Celtics, shot only one fewer FTA, and had a higher FT% (74.4% CLE vs 70% BOS). They matched the Celtics’ team assist total, and held the Celts under 100 points.

The problem was Rondo was an absolute demon (28 points, 13 assists, 18 rebounds, 2 steals, only 4 TOs, and only 1 minute of rest). He dominated every aspect of the game, single-handedly outrebounded the Cavs in the 4th quarter, and in a straight-up player comparison made LeBron an also-ran (22 points on 7-18 FG, 9 Reb, 8 ast, 2 stl, 1 block, but 7 TOs and 0-5 3P). It should be taken with a grain of salt because of the usual media exaggeration, but before the game was even over, the broadcast team was discussing that Rondo’s game could be one of the greatest playoff performances in Celtic history.

If there’s one thing that Cavs fans should understand by now, it’s that games can be won by great individual performances. Even when the opposing team plays well. That’s what the playoffs are all about some times. In this case, the Cavs’ superstar had a worse game than the opponents’, who had a performance for the ages.

Overall, the Cavs did some things right. But the Celtics—really, Rondo—did more things right, so they won the game. It’s not sorcery, and it’s not completely our guys’ fault. It’s basketball, and some times, it’s life. So let’s all quit acting like the entire thing is just a result of the deficiencies on our own side, and that if the team would’ve just tried harder, they’d be going back to Cleveland 3-1.

-T

April 12, 2010
Cavs-Magic Bazooka Point

Today, we all witnessed something special: we watched a coach other than Don Nelson actively attempt to lose a game.

After choosing to deactivate LeBron and Anthony Parker, Coldstone ended the suspense of an until-then competitive contest between the Cavs’ reserves and the Magic by holding both Mo and Jamison out for the entire fourth quarter.

To that point, both guys had been playing very well. Mo had a 19 point, 9 assist, 50% 3P performance going through 28 minutes. Jamison had 19 points and 6 rebounds in 29 minutes, even shooting 75% FT, which, as we all know, is unheard of since the trade.

Orlando seemed to have no good answer for either of them. Mo clearly believed that he could drive on Jameer Nelson the entire day, and nothing Stan Van Gundy tried against Jamison seemed to have much of an effect—and there was definitely some experimentation involved.

However, with the game very much still up for grabs, Coldstone started the fourth with both men on the bench. The deep reserves took the lead a few minutes into the quarter, but were unable to hold it. Coldstone never brought Mo or Jamison back into the game to try to steal the victory, either. Instead, the Magic were able to barely outplay the reserves and walk away with a shaky 6 point win.

I have incredibly mixed feelings about how this went down.

Like Brian Windhorst, it doesn’t feel right to me to actively hold back almost everything in order to win. Non-competition doesn’t mesh with my personality. It’s not as if the choice was about playing LeBron versus not playing LeBron. It was about putting in guys who, to that point, had played an entirely reasonable number of minutes, were playing well, and could potentially have helped tip the scales in a season series against a hated rival.

However, I also recognize that this is a classic “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation for Coldstone. If he puts in Mo and Jamison, and one of them gets hurt, he gets killed for putting starters out in the final minutes of a meaningless game. (Let’s not forget that this almost happened to Jamison against the Bulls Thursday.) If he keeps them out and the Cavs lose (as they did), he gets grilled for intentionally holding back.

The proponents of this second school would also argue, I think, that the Cavs missed a chance to deal a psychological blow to the Magic. Had they taken this game with Bron, Shaq, and even AP sitting, then maybe the Magic really would’ve felt like they’re in trouble when the Cavs come back at them at full force in the Conference Finals (assuming that match-up ultimately happens).

I don’t want to completely throw out that school of thought, especially since I just wrote a post based on a similar idea last week. But I think there’s a major difference that we have to recognize. 

Think about it this way:  the Magic, playing in a game that had meaning (in that it could allow them to potentially overtake the Lakers for the overall #2 seed), playing their starters full minutes, getting a monster performance from Da-wight (22 points, 13 reb, 6 blk), had to fight like hell to barely overcome a Cavs team with no LeBron (the best player in the league), no Shaq (the primary player brought in to contain Da-wight Howard), and when it came down to it, no Antawn Jamison (the player they haven’t been able to figure out how to defend), and no Mo Williams (the player who was killing them for 3 quarters despite his epic struggles against them last season). The Magic still only put up 98 points and got practically nothing (6 points on 3-10 FG) from Vince Carter, the guy they brought in to replace Hedo Turkoglu, whom the Cavs were never able to figure out.

This is one where the players interviewed post-game say things like, “We struggled out there today, but all that matters was that we got a win.” That’s the right thing to say, sure. But there’s no way that after it’s said, the player walks back into the locker room feeling good about the potential of seeing the opposing team again at full-strength on a big stage. In that sense, if there was psychological damage to be done in this game, my guess is that it happened regardless of the actual outcome.

In fact, I would actually go one step further. Say Coldstone puts Jamison and Mo back in the game in the second half of the 4th. They run their best offense. They give maximum effort. They show they care about winning…but they lose anyway. Sure, LeBron and Shaq are still on the bench. But that’s a win that the Magic can potentially use to their advantage down the road. They can say, “OK, they weren’t at full force, but we still took their best shot and were able to withstand it.”

In this way, the Celtics game on Easter is a good example. Sure, the Cavs were without Shaq and Andy, but they went as hard as they could to roar back from a 20+ point deficit and nearly take the game. But they fell short. Did that register with Boston as a sobering moment? No, it registered as a well-deserved opportunity to talk shit, pound their chests, to convince themselves that they could beat the Cavs. And I guarantee that they’ll carry that attitude into their next match-up with the Cavs in the post-season, if it happens.

Instead, the Magic have to go back to Orlando thinking, “Crap, they weren’t at full force to begin with, they played the end of their bench in the 4th, basically ran around like a JV team, didn’t even foul to try to extend the game…and we won by two possessions. This is not good.” 

To use a basketball analogy, I would equate Coldstone’s strategy to “pulling the chair” on a post player trying to back down a defender. The offensive player readies himself to go up against maximum resistance, finds none, and is immediately thrown off his game. It’s like sucking the oxygen out of a room where there’s a fire.

So while it goes against my own nature to not compete as hard as possible, I ultimately think Coldstone made the right decision. I recognize that’s a controversial opinion, but as usual, we’re not here to cooperate.

-T.