December 6, 2011
The Browns Tell You It’s OK To Suck Forever As Long As You Never Quit

The Browns posted the above article on their Facebook page today. I was going to comment on the post there, but I thought, “What the hell?” why not write a blurb for Mesa instead.

Here then are my thoughts —

LOL at the organization that has gotten knocked down about 42K times since reforming in 1999, only been to the playoffs once, and generally shown little to no improvement from year to year emphasizing “getting up after each fall.” 

Last time I checked, based on the fact that the team is still an operational business that is part of the National Football League they are contractually obligated to “get up after each fall.”

Congratulations, Browns. You were scheduled to play 16 games this year. Therefore, you must “bounce back” against the Steelers.

And don’t worry: No matter what, your fan base will stay loyal.

February 1, 2011
The 4-3 Defense and the Princeton Offense

Tim, myself, and @joshrosen had an illuminating, albeit brief, conversation on Twitter Sunday night regarding the Browns’ apparent switch to a 4-3 Defense.

Ever since the possibility of this transformation came up, I’ve been asking myself a simple but important question. 

Why? 

Why do the Browns want to become a 4-3 Defense? 

Is the 4-3 Defense more effective than the 3-4 Defense they have been running? 

Does Pat Shurmur only understand how to coach a 4-3 Defense? 

Does Tom Heckert only know how to supply players for a 4-3 Defense? 

What, really, is the point? 

This is a crucial question because obviously the two kinds of defenses need different types of personals. In the simplest terms, the 4-3 needs one more starting end than the 3-4. The 3-4 needs one more starting linebacker than the 4-3.

This means that a personnel overhaul is coming. Free agents will be signed. Draft picks will be used. Trades could be made. 

And for what? 

If the 4-3 was really more effective than the 3-4, you would think that the two teams competing in the Super Bowl this Sunday would be deploying it. 

They are not. 

The Browns had a bunch of weaknesses already. Now they have one more - defensive players who are not suited for the 4-3. 

If Pat Shurmur only knows how to coach a 4-3, I’m not sure what to say. As a former Offensive Coordinator, ostensibly, he should understand both types of defenses. And since there isn’t going to be an Offensive Coordinator on this coaching staff at all, I don’t see how Shurmur will have any time to spend on the defense as is. 

So what was it? Heckert can figure out 3-4 personnel, can’t he? He did so last year. Was Dick Jauron such a can’t miss hire that the Browns had to have him - and Jauron, we know, has a history coaching the 4-3? 

This seems unlikely since they did, after all, interview other candidates. 

When Tim, Josh, and I were exchanging messages about this, Tim made what I thought was a great point: “Any time a coach preferentially imposes a system w/o considering strengths of his personnel it is mistake.” 

While I would hesitate to use the “always” that is buried implicitly inside of Tim’s tweet, I largely agree. If a coach is going to demand his team play a certain style or within a specific system that runs counter to the personnel he was given he better make a compelling argument for why. 

Here, in Cleveland, we’re watching this movie already. Byron Scott came in and kicked out Mike Brown’s offensive and defensive systems, simply for the sake of his own familiarity. Sure, Scott has had success running the vaunted Princeton Offense before, but he did so with superstar point guards Chris Paul and Jason Kidd at the helm. A carbon copy of either one of those two point guards is not on this team.

So, I ask, what was the point of installing a new system? Because Scott liked the Princeton Offense more?

This is a classic mistake by upper management. We all have our preferences, but our preferences must serve a purpose or they won’t be effective at anything beyond making ourselves feel more comfortable. 

Which, when your job is winning games, shouldn’t really be at the top of the priority list. 

Ultimately, changing systems means re-education and changing personnel - and it probably means some amount of regression. In the case of the Cavs, this has actually worked out well, since it is better for the organization in the long run that the team is tanking this badly this quickly.

When it comes to the Browns, however, another year of regression is unacceptable. Otherwise, why bother firing Eric Mangini if you’re just planning on getting worse anyway? 

You don’t. You fire Mangini to get better. And there is reason to wonder if switching to the 4-3 will make getting better in 2011 at least slightly more difficult for the Cleveland Browns.  

January 30, 2011
Colt Vs Kolb

 

Adam Schefter is reporting that the Philadelphia Eagles have decided to franchise Mike Vick and trade Kevin Kolb.

More importantly to us, sources are listing the Browns as one of the teams potentially interested in trading for him.

You’re not going to find a bigger proponent than me of the notion that until your NFL team has a quarterback, they’re just not important. You’re also not going to find anyone more unsure than me about whether or not Colt McCoy is the real deal at the position.

Then why am I adamantly opposed to the possibility of Holmgren & Company dealing for Kolb?  Two simple reasons.

First, by almost every statistical category I’ve checked, McCoy was better than Kolb last season. From our friends at Advanced NFL Stats:

2010 COLT McCOY vs. KEVIN KOLB

Games played:  8 vs. 7

Win Probability Added: -0.18 vs -1.02

Expected Points Added: 16.5 vs 4.4

Completion %: 60.8 vs 60.8

Pass Yards per Game: 197 vs 171

INT per Game: 1.125 vs 1.0

% of Pass Attempts Over 15 yards: 20.3 vs 19.6

Adjusted Yards Per Attempt: 4.2 vs 3.8

In summary: McCoy played one more game than Kolb last season, but apart from throwing .125 more interceptions per game, was as good or better in every way.

I would highlight Completion Percentage, Percentage of Pass Attempts over 15 yards, and Adjusted Yards per Attempt in this comparison, because they illustrate that McCoy and Kolb are both West Coast style quarterbacks. In other words, both are equally well-suited toward the type of O that Pat Shurmur is going to run.

Add to the above that we were bombarded with report after report about McCoy’s leadership ability and presence in the huddle as a rookie, and I just don’t see a logical argument for the idea that Kolb is a superior quarterback.

This leads us to the second reason that I’m against the idea of a trade: compensation. If memory serves, the Eagles are supposedly asking for multiple picks, including at least one first rounder, for Kolb. The Browns need talent all over the field, with the possible exception of RB and the center to left side of the O line. Given that reality, shipping off multiple picks in order to acquire a quarterback who is not markedly better than your incumbent seems like about as good an idea as wearing capri pants to a UAW bar.

So while I’m not yet sold on McCoy, I hope the Browns brain / mustache trust recognizes that they need a talented, deep draft class more than they need another unproven quarterback.

-T

January 25, 2011
NFL: the Official League of Non-Major Markets(?)

Yesterday, Mike made an excellent point about what dark clouds the new NBA free agent circus may hold for small-to-mid-market franchises. His conclusion syncs up nicely with something I’ve been thinking about since the end of the Browns season.

The question is this: Is it possible that in a few years, the NFL will be the only sustainable pro sport in non-major markets, i.e. the only one where cities like Cleveland can legitimately hope to compete for a title?

Based on the available evidence, I believe the answer may be ‘yes.’

I’ve considered a few crucial differences between the NBA and NFL in this regard. I’ve ignored Major League Baseball because their system is currently so far out of wack—see: the complete lack of a salary cap—that it hardly seems worth addressing. (Let alone that MLB’s largest problem is that almost no one in contemporary American life wants to watch 162 regular season games that last 3.5+ hours each.)

Unless the parameters change in the new CBA, rookie contracts will be one major determinant of the answer. The current rules dictate that a player drafted in the first half of the first round can be signed to a 6-year contract; players in the second half of the first round to a 5-year contract; and players after the first round to a 4-year contract. (Thanks to Ask the Commish for the details.)

The contrast with the NBA is evident immediately. For first-round picks, the longest contract a team can extend is 4 years, with the latter 2 years both existing as team options. If a contract extension isn’t worked out by the end of the 4th year, the team can put forth a qualifying offer for a 5th year—but that only makes the player a restricted free agent. Further, if the player decides to play out the 5th year, he obtains veto power over any trades, then becomes an unrestricted free agent the following summer. (Thanks to Hoopsworld for the low-down.)

Perhaps counter-intuitively, NBA second round picks gain leverage even faster than their first-round cohorts. The longest contract an NBA team will normally negotiate here is 2-years of nonguaranteed money. However, if a second round pick pans out in a major way, he’s free to test the market as quickly as his sophomore, or at worst, junior season in the league.

The end result of this comparison? Current NFL rules protect their franchises by providing longer guarantees for potential star players than their NBA counterparts.

Consider the following:  In 2010, the St. Louis Rams signed Sam Bradford to a 6-year contract. Meanwhile, LeBron was a Cav for only 7 total seasons: 4 on his rookie contract, another 3 thanks to an extension.

This example is one where simple subtraction simply doesn’t tell the story. Yes, we’re only talking about a net 1 year difference between the Rams’ agreement with Bradford and the Cavs’ two agreements with LeBron. But the difference is continuity. After going 7-9 and barely missing the playoffs in his rookie season, the Rams’ front office knows that Bradford is a franchise player that they have for the next 5 seasons, guaranteed. As we all know too well, the Cavs didn’t have such a long-term safety net. Instead, they allowed themselves to be forced into a series of panic upgrades that were never conducive to a strong, long-term foundation.

The reason was obvious: LeBron’s free agency was always pending, so they had to prove they could win now in order to keep him around. The Rams, meanwhile, have half a decade to build around Bradford.

The contrast carries through the lower branches of each sport’s draft: by the time a second round NFL pick can become a free agent, a second round NBA pick will have had the free agency option two or even three years earlier.

All of this plays into the viability of pro football versus pro basketball in cities like Cleveland. As proven by LeBron and Chris Bosh, young NBA stars are no longer prone to take slightly more money to stay with the franchise that drafted them. Their desire to build “super teams” is hardly surprising, given the (Mesa favorite) fact that only 8 different NBA franchises have won the title in the past 30 years.

But young NFL stars are basically locked into their first franchise for a substantial time period from the starting gun. With a skillful personnel department, NFL teams have the time they need to convince budding stars to stick around via complementary moves. Given the numbers, those players also have less incentive to migrate to specific alternatives than their NBA counterparts anyway; in the same 30 year period, 14 different NFL teams have won the Super Bowl.

These rookie contract considerations aren’t the only elements that empower small-to-mid-market NFL teams. Their ability to “franchise” a player otherwise ready to hit the open market is another powerful tool in the quest for competitive balance.

For the uninitiated, the franchise tag essentially blocks a player at the end of his contract from entering free agency. If he’s hit with an exclusive franchise tag, the player cannot negotiate with other teams, but is compensated by receiving one year’s salary equal to either the average of the top 5 salaries at his position in the current NFL season, or 120% of his previous contract year, whichever is greater. If he’s hit with a non-exclusive franchise tag, the player is compensated by receiving either the average of the top 5 salaries at his position in the previous NFL season, or 120% of his previous contract year, whichever is greater.

However, non-exclusive franchise players also maintain the right to negotiate with other teams. If they sign an offer sheet elsewhere, the original franchise has the right to match the offer, or else refuse it and receive two first-round draft picks from the franchise player’s chosen destination. In comparison to the NBA equivalent, this system is vastly preferable to any franchise unable to maintain a star player. Two first rounders in the NFL draft is a HUGE bounty. By contrast, the best an NBA team can do when a star chooses to go elsewhere is normally a few infinitely less valuable future draft picks and a trade exception. (We can all see how much that trade exception has helped the Cavs this season.)

If all of the above weren’t enough, also consider the prevalence of undrafted NFL free agents or late round picks not only making an NFL roster, but becoming impact players. (Peter King examines this phenomenon briefly in his most recent Monday Morning Quarterback - just scroll down to “The [Super Bowl] match-up is a reward to two organizations that built teams.”) The probability of a second round pick or undrafted NBA free agent having the same kind of effect on a team’s fortune seems to be much rarer—and again, even when it does happen, the team that took a chance on the player in question almost immediately has to work to try to retain his services.

Admittedly, I have no idea what the new NBA and NFL collective bargaining agreements will look like. However, if current rules and current trends largely remain, then I sincerely believe that we are rapidly approaching a time when the NFL is the only legitimate game in town for cities like Cleveland. Here’s hoping I’m dead wrong.

-T

January 19, 2011
A Simple Question About Offensive Coordinators

This is a simple question, really, from a very tired and overworked young man. 

Should anyone on the planet be surprised the Browns haven’t been able to hire an Offensive Coordinator yet? 

I don’t think so.

Why? 

Because who wants to be an Offensive Coordinator on a team where they aren’t even going to get to call the plays? 

Even better, the guy calling the plays instead is a rookie Head Coach. 

Even better still, the guy calling the plays is a rookie Head Coach with only two years of experience as an Offensive Coordinator. 

For the St. Louis Rams. 

This remains one of the strangest things about the Shurmur hire, frankly. 

Why did Mike Holmgren feel the need to accept the idea of Shurmur calling his own plays? 

In my mind, this looks like a categorically terrible idea. Shurmur has never been a Head Coach in the NFL before. What is the point of giving him play calling duties when he is already going to have to figure out how to juggle more responsibility than he has ever had before? 

Is it because he’s such a remarkable play caller? 

I find this hard to believe. 

And I’m sure a lot of Offensive Coordinator candidates are asking themselves the same, or similar, questions. 

Moreover, even if an Offensive Coordinator were comfortable with the idea of coordinating an offense for which they do not call the plays - what this would entail, I’m not quite sure - they would have to be relatively uncomfortable with the notion that they have almost no chance of promotion. You don’t get a head coaching job by being an Offensive Coordinator and not calling the plays. 

The person who calls the plays gets all of the credit. 

Does taking a job that someone else will get all of the credit for sound like a good idea to you? 

It doesn’t to me. 

It seems then that the Browns will either have to hire someone who is awfully desperate - or they’re just going to have to hire from the very bottom of the barrel, like somebody who’s currently stuck at the junior college or high school level. 

Ha.

I’m kidding.

Well, not completely…