January 12, 2011
Byron Scott & the Case of the 55 Point Loss

A lot has been said in the past 24 hours about the Cavs’ 55-point humiliation at Staples Center on Tuesday night. There’s the quantifiable and historic angle: largest margin of defeat in franchise history, fewest points scored in franchise history, etc. There’s the dramatic angle, courtesy of LeBron’s Twitter-supplied middle finger to Dan Gilbert and who knows who else. This being Cleveland, there’s also the totally cliché self-pity angle coming from some sectors (“Why oh why do we have to suffer the embarrassment of being associated with this team?”)

What I haven’t seen anyone else mention is the coaching angle.

By this point in the season, my opinion of Byron Scott has been well-documented. Simply put, I think he’s a fraud. The only way that a team led by a coach with a “defensive mindset” can lose a game by 55 points is, frankly, if his system is horribly flawed; he’s not teaching it properly to his players; or he’s not motivating them effectively enough to make them execute it. Regardless of which of those doors you choose, they all open onto a portrait of Byron Scott in a Hamburglar costume, since at this point he’s basically stealing money from ownership under the guise of “rebuilding.”

Clearly the Cavs are not rich in talent at this point. But even with their injuries, I defy the notion that their skill level is low enough to lead to a 55 point burial on its own. I don’t care if it’s against the Lakers, the Heat, or any other top-tier team in the league. A 25 point loss? Totally reasonable given what this season has become. Even 35 is within reason. But 55?

No, I believe that a large portion of the blame should be laid at the doorstep of the head coach and his philosophy. He, not the players, is primarily to blame for this outcome.

How can I say this in good conscience, you ask? Because this isn’t the first time a Byron Scott-led team has been torched by an almost inconceivable margin.

Less than two years ago, Scott’s New Orleans Hornets made their way into a first round post-season match-up with the Denver Nuggets. On April 27, 2009, the Hornets hosted—hosted—the Nuggets, who returned their hospitality by bludgeoning New Orleans to the tune of a mind-blowing 58 points. Final score: DEN 121 – NOR 63. In the playoffs.

Was the roster the problem then? I don’t think so. Not when you consider that NOLA’s starting five included a healthy Chris Paul, Tyson Chandler, and David West. On their own, that trio should make a 58-point loss virtually impossible, unless they were all being mind-controlled Manchurian Candidate-style from the opposing bench to pass into the bleachers and shoot at their own basket.

Look, you won’t find a bigger proponent of the “small sample size” caveat than me. Despite the shock and awe, we are still only talking about two games. But it’s worth pointing out that Scott was fired by the Hornets 9 games into the season that followed the end of the aforementioned Nuggets series.

Why is this important? Because it means Scott’s teams have lost by 55 points or more twice in his last 50 games as a head coach. In one of those losses, his squad was being captained by arguably the greatest point guard, and one of the greatest players, of the past decade, and the team surrounding him was good enough to be in the playoffs. And none of that mattered.

So while two games are not statistically significant on their own, they help clarify the picture created by the Cavs’ many other quantifiable deficiencies. (For instance, that they are now a full 3 points per 100 possessions worse in efficiency differential than Sacramento, the 29th place team.) Under Byron Scott, the team has gone from being a weak one to an unwatchable one, and his previous job performance suggests that it may have less to do with the players than with the man commanding them.

-T

January 10, 2011
The End of Varejao’s Season

On Sunday, the Cavs announced that Anderson Varejao’s season is most likely over.

This has an obvious effect on the team, as Varejao was a part of the Cavs’ best performing line-up (Boobie Gibson-Mo Williams-Anthony Parker-Antawn Jamison-Varejao), a line-up that also got more floor time than any other unit. 

It is also worth mentioning that Varejao’s 2-year Adjusted +/- ranks 9th overall in the NBA at +7.40. 

One is left to assume then that with Varejao out, the Cavs are going to play even worse than they are already.

This, I would think, means the chances of the Cavs finishing with the worst record in the league have dramatically increased overnight. 

I know. This may not be a bad thing. 

But it also might be terrible. 

The problem, of course, is that the Cavs finishing with the worst record in the league guarantees them almost nothing beyond a top four pick in the draft, thanks to the lottery system. Furthermore, because of the threat of a lockout in the 2011-12 season, players will likely forego the draft, making this an especially poor draft class. 

In other words, the Cavs will end up with either pick number one, two, three, or four, in a year where there are no potential superstars available.

And, as we all know, your team is nothing until it has a superstar. 

At the very least then, if the Cavs were going to be without Varejao for the rest of this season, it would have been best if they could have got something else in return besides simply a better shot at the first pick in a weak draft. Now, unfortunately, that will be impossible - and it’s hard to believe that Varejao’s value will ever be higher than it was this season. He is, after all, a 28-year-old big man whose greatest talent is his ability to play hard as hell … how much longer can that last? 

We’ll never know if the Cavs could have dealt Andy in the summer or not. We’ll never know if the organization wanted Varejao on the team as a minor gesture to appease the people who bought season tickets when they thought LeBron would be here. I understand that for business purposes - for customer satisfaction reasons, really - the team had to at least pretend it could compete. Clearly, however, it could not. And now we’ve ended up with the worst of all worlds. A terrible team that’s pissing off ticket buyers, preparing to earn a top four pick in a yawner of a draft, that also just lost its most valuable trade chip. 

But hey at least the Q still gives away free Chalupas. 

January 6, 2011
Cavs Milestone Time

It’s official: with Sacramento’s win at home against Denver last night, they have now pushed the Cavs down to the sad position of holding the worst record in the NBA (8-27).

In light of this checkpoint, I thought it would be good to take a quick look at how they’re progressing under the great Byron Scott.

Since it’s something I highlighted as a red flag back in November, I’m thrilled to report that the Cavs are now indisputably the worst team in the league at defending the three point arc—and it’s not close. Through 35 games, Cavs’ opponents are shooting a staggering 41.7% 3P. Their nearest competitor is the Clippers at 39.7%. That’s a full 2 percentage points difference, or one-fifth the difference between last place in this category and first place (Atlanta and Miami are both holding opponents to 31.9% 3P).

Other statistical categories of note for defense and rebounding:

Defensive Efficiency: 107.8 points per 100 possessions (tied for 25th)

Opponent FG%: 47.3 (tied for 27th)

Opponent True Shooting %: 56.3 (28th)

Offensive Rebound Rate: 21.48 (29th)

Defensive Rebound Rate: 76.41 (4th)

Total Rebound Rate: 47.88 (26th)

So cornerstone #1 of the Byron Scott regime—defense—has flourished to the extent that, on average, every Cavs opponent shoots threes at an All Star level; shuts them down on the glass, particularly the offensive glass; and basically scores at will. 

But that’s ok, because Scott’s other cornerstone—the fluid, fast-paced Princeton offense—more than makes up for the defensive hiccups. 

Offensive stats of note:

Pace: 95.6 (14th)

Offensive Efficiency: 97.6 points per 100 possessions (29th)

True Shooting %: 51.0 (28th)

FG%: 42.7 (29th)

3P%: 33.5 (24th)

Shot Attempts At The Rim: 21.1 (21st)

Shot Attempts at <10’: 12.9 (14th)

Shot Attempts 10-15’: 8.0 (6th)

Shot Attempts 16-23’: 20.0 (19th)

3PA: 19.3 (10th)

What do these numbers tell us? Almost at the midway point of the season, the Cavs are still playing at an average pace, and their horrendous offensive efficiency stems from the fact that they shoot a below average number of dunks and lay-ups, an average number of shots from inside 10’, a ton of mid-range 2s, and a relatively high number of threes—and they’re far below average on connecting at any of those distances. Part of that is talent, but part of it also has to do with whether those guys are getting good looks. By and large, they’re not. Considering that creating good looks is the entire point of an offensive system, it’s safe to say at this point that Scott’s is the Elephant Man of the NBA.

Combine the offense and defense together, and you end up with the coup de grace:

Point Differential: -10.20 (30th)

Congratulations, Byron Scott. It didn’t even take until the All-Star break for stats to conclusively back what we’ve all suspected for at least a month: you are responsible for running the worst team in the league. So for any of you out there who wanted Mike Brown gone so badly, hope you’re enjoying the show.

-T