January 12, 2011
Byron Scott & the Case of the 55 Point Loss

A lot has been said in the past 24 hours about the Cavs’ 55-point humiliation at Staples Center on Tuesday night. There’s the quantifiable and historic angle: largest margin of defeat in franchise history, fewest points scored in franchise history, etc. There’s the dramatic angle, courtesy of LeBron’s Twitter-supplied middle finger to Dan Gilbert and who knows who else. This being Cleveland, there’s also the totally cliché self-pity angle coming from some sectors (“Why oh why do we have to suffer the embarrassment of being associated with this team?”)

What I haven’t seen anyone else mention is the coaching angle.

By this point in the season, my opinion of Byron Scott has been well-documented. Simply put, I think he’s a fraud. The only way that a team led by a coach with a “defensive mindset” can lose a game by 55 points is, frankly, if his system is horribly flawed; he’s not teaching it properly to his players; or he’s not motivating them effectively enough to make them execute it. Regardless of which of those doors you choose, they all open onto a portrait of Byron Scott in a Hamburglar costume, since at this point he’s basically stealing money from ownership under the guise of “rebuilding.”

Clearly the Cavs are not rich in talent at this point. But even with their injuries, I defy the notion that their skill level is low enough to lead to a 55 point burial on its own. I don’t care if it’s against the Lakers, the Heat, or any other top-tier team in the league. A 25 point loss? Totally reasonable given what this season has become. Even 35 is within reason. But 55?

No, I believe that a large portion of the blame should be laid at the doorstep of the head coach and his philosophy. He, not the players, is primarily to blame for this outcome.

How can I say this in good conscience, you ask? Because this isn’t the first time a Byron Scott-led team has been torched by an almost inconceivable margin.

Less than two years ago, Scott’s New Orleans Hornets made their way into a first round post-season match-up with the Denver Nuggets. On April 27, 2009, the Hornets hosted—hosted—the Nuggets, who returned their hospitality by bludgeoning New Orleans to the tune of a mind-blowing 58 points. Final score: DEN 121 – NOR 63. In the playoffs.

Was the roster the problem then? I don’t think so. Not when you consider that NOLA’s starting five included a healthy Chris Paul, Tyson Chandler, and David West. On their own, that trio should make a 58-point loss virtually impossible, unless they were all being mind-controlled Manchurian Candidate-style from the opposing bench to pass into the bleachers and shoot at their own basket.

Look, you won’t find a bigger proponent of the “small sample size” caveat than me. Despite the shock and awe, we are still only talking about two games. But it’s worth pointing out that Scott was fired by the Hornets 9 games into the season that followed the end of the aforementioned Nuggets series.

Why is this important? Because it means Scott’s teams have lost by 55 points or more twice in his last 50 games as a head coach. In one of those losses, his squad was being captained by arguably the greatest point guard, and one of the greatest players, of the past decade, and the team surrounding him was good enough to be in the playoffs. And none of that mattered.

So while two games are not statistically significant on their own, they help clarify the picture created by the Cavs’ many other quantifiable deficiencies. (For instance, that they are now a full 3 points per 100 possessions worse in efficiency differential than Sacramento, the 29th place team.) Under Byron Scott, the team has gone from being a weak one to an unwatchable one, and his previous job performance suggests that it may have less to do with the players than with the man commanding them.

-T

January 6, 2011
Cavs Milestone Time

It’s official: with Sacramento’s win at home against Denver last night, they have now pushed the Cavs down to the sad position of holding the worst record in the NBA (8-27).

In light of this checkpoint, I thought it would be good to take a quick look at how they’re progressing under the great Byron Scott.

Since it’s something I highlighted as a red flag back in November, I’m thrilled to report that the Cavs are now indisputably the worst team in the league at defending the three point arc—and it’s not close. Through 35 games, Cavs’ opponents are shooting a staggering 41.7% 3P. Their nearest competitor is the Clippers at 39.7%. That’s a full 2 percentage points difference, or one-fifth the difference between last place in this category and first place (Atlanta and Miami are both holding opponents to 31.9% 3P).

Other statistical categories of note for defense and rebounding:

Defensive Efficiency: 107.8 points per 100 possessions (tied for 25th)

Opponent FG%: 47.3 (tied for 27th)

Opponent True Shooting %: 56.3 (28th)

Offensive Rebound Rate: 21.48 (29th)

Defensive Rebound Rate: 76.41 (4th)

Total Rebound Rate: 47.88 (26th)

So cornerstone #1 of the Byron Scott regime—defense—has flourished to the extent that, on average, every Cavs opponent shoots threes at an All Star level; shuts them down on the glass, particularly the offensive glass; and basically scores at will. 

But that’s ok, because Scott’s other cornerstone—the fluid, fast-paced Princeton offense—more than makes up for the defensive hiccups. 

Offensive stats of note:

Pace: 95.6 (14th)

Offensive Efficiency: 97.6 points per 100 possessions (29th)

True Shooting %: 51.0 (28th)

FG%: 42.7 (29th)

3P%: 33.5 (24th)

Shot Attempts At The Rim: 21.1 (21st)

Shot Attempts at <10’: 12.9 (14th)

Shot Attempts 10-15’: 8.0 (6th)

Shot Attempts 16-23’: 20.0 (19th)

3PA: 19.3 (10th)

What do these numbers tell us? Almost at the midway point of the season, the Cavs are still playing at an average pace, and their horrendous offensive efficiency stems from the fact that they shoot a below average number of dunks and lay-ups, an average number of shots from inside 10’, a ton of mid-range 2s, and a relatively high number of threes—and they’re far below average on connecting at any of those distances. Part of that is talent, but part of it also has to do with whether those guys are getting good looks. By and large, they’re not. Considering that creating good looks is the entire point of an offensive system, it’s safe to say at this point that Scott’s is the Elephant Man of the NBA.

Combine the offense and defense together, and you end up with the coup de grace:

Point Differential: -10.20 (30th)

Congratulations, Byron Scott. It didn’t even take until the All-Star break for stats to conclusively back what we’ve all suspected for at least a month: you are responsible for running the worst team in the league. So for any of you out there who wanted Mike Brown gone so badly, hope you’re enjoying the show.

-T

December 23, 2010
Cavs-Hawks Bazooka Point

Last night, while watching the Cavaliers lose in rather pedestrian ways to the Hawks, I was thinking about which team I would rather be a fan of right now. I was very prepared to say I would rather be a fan of the Cavs than of the Hawks … until I read this insider piece from Jodie Valade about Byron Scott’s desire for a “dominant” back to the basket post player.

In the article, Scott once again proclaims the brilliance of the Princeton offense: 

“I’ve watched teams that have post up guys, and I know what a post up guy can do as far as this offense … when you get a good post-up guy this offense runs even better [emphasis mine].” 

I guess he means even better than 30th in the NBA.

That quote - as if there is some surprise to the notion that a fantastic post-up player will help an offense - was followed by Valade’s analysis: 

“Barring an opportunity to snag one of the few back to the basket players in the league (Orlando’s Dwight Howard probably isn’t available), Scott wouldn’t mind a dominant perimeter player, a la Chris Paul whom he had in New Orleans or Jason Kidd whom he had in New Jersey.” 

Just a shocking appraisal. You mean Byron would rather have Chris Paul than Mo Williams or Ramon Sessions? Remarkable.

Valade deploys another quote from Scott next: 

“Most teams in the league that have a lot of success either have a big-time post up player or a big-time player. Either one. Either a dynamic post-up player or a perimeter player who’s pretty damn good. One of those two.” 

This, I guess, is what we are treated to in post-LeBron era Cleveland: proclamations by the head coach that his team would be even more successful with a “dynamic post-up player” (when was the last time one of these guys entered the league?) or with a “perimeter player who’s pretty damn good” while beat reporters inform us that Dwight Howard isn’t on the trading block. 

Watching the Cavs lose tonight, I must say that their effort was fine, but little else was working. The team’s pace is getting better - up to 12th in the league - but they still don’t know how to push the ball … either the guards don’t dart up the floor or the bigs don’t run with them. Watch the Mavericks play fast. Watch the Heat play fast. On top of this, the Cavs are too small to finish at the rim. And because they can’t finish at the rim, and they can’t beat anyone off of the dribble, the defenders are free to guard the perimeter players tightly, preventing them from getting open jump shots - which, frankly, is the one thing a lot of these guys are good at.

Of course, much of this is a product of the players being chosen to fit alongside of LeBron, so I don’t blame them … but Byron Scott sure sounds like a coach who is trying to transition from “this team has more talent than any of the other teams I took over - and I don’t have to teach them how to win” to “we’re not losing because of me - no, I need a big-time player.” Add to this an owner in Dan Gilbert who defined his franchise with the clear basketball principles of two men (Danny Ferry and Mike Brown) … and then simply excised them for the hodgepodge of concepts we get to watch now on a nightly basis. 

Please, Chris Grant, trade Anderson Varejao while he’s still in his prime. Let the man be great at what he does for a team that actually has a prayer. 

And, in the meantime, Hawks fans … you may think you’re stuck in a cycle of mediocrity, but … well, actually, you’re not better off than us. We’re both f’d. Except we get lottery picks.

Ha ha ha. 

December 21, 2010
The NBA’s Fatal Flaw

On Sunday, Adrian Wojnarowski posted this piece on Dwight Howard’s championship ambitions, and the inevitable pressure his demands place on the Orlando Magic’s front office, given his eventual status as a free agent in 2012. 

This is a story all of us in Cleveland are beyond familiar with. We heard LeBron James repeatedly say that his entire free agency decision would be based on which organization gave him the best opportunity to win multiple championships. It seems that this track has proliferated throughout the NBA, from Carmelo Anthony to Chris Paul and now on to Howard. Everyone wants championships, and they want them now. ASAP. And not just one. Many. 

Now that the Cavaliers are no longer competing for the title - and who knows when they will again - I’ve gained a little bit of perspective on the NBA as a whole. Basketball remains probably my favorite sport, but there is no doubt in my mind that professional basketball has a major issue moving forward when it comes to competitive balance. 

Every superstar player wants a championship, but only one superstar gets to win one every year (give or take 1 or 1.5 superstars, depending on your definition of a superstar). If a superstar doesn’t win the title, he blames the organization, not himself - he’s a superstar after all, how could it be his fault? - and threatens to bolt town at the first chance he gets, whether it’s through free agency or by demanding a trade.

In the past, these threats could be seen as somewhat idle since only one superstar (Shaq) ever took less money to switch teams. No more. LeBron changed all of that. 

On its own, superstar players wanting to win championships isn’t a bad thing for the league. Commissioner David Stern should want competitive athletes. Competitive spirit fuels close games, heightens drama, and makes the sport more exciting to watch. So what’s the problem then?

The real problem is that, in the NBA, almost nobody wins a championship.  

Since the 1979-80 NBA season, only eight different teams have won titles. 

Thirty years of basketball, eight champions. 

This strikes me as entirely unsustainable.

Yet, at the same time, this total lack of competitive balance has been going on for almost one-third of a century and professional basketball in America is still in business. It is, of course, nowhere near as popular as the NFL though, and I don’t see how the owners and the league office can’t be concerned about how this dynamic effects the future of their business. 

I would go so far as to argue that the lack of outright dread on this topic suggests that the owners must be making so much money that they don’t really care about the quality of their product. Despite what the owners are now saying publicly in the wake of ongoing negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, how else could they possibly be happy knowing that each year only about four teams have a legitimate chance of winning the title?

They can’t be. It’s ludicrous.

And now that superstar players, who grew up seeing Michael Jordan lauded for winning six championships while Karl Malone, Charles Barkley, and Patrick Ewing were derided for “not being able to get it done,” are placing an extreme emphasis on not just being great, but on being champions (you know, like Adam Morrison), the whole system is in real trouble.

The entire purpose of Bird Rights - allowing teams to pay the players they have more than any other team, to keep athletes, especially great ones, in a single organization for as long as possible in order to build continuity with the fan base - is in complete jeopardy. 

We’re talking about a different franchise meeting the apocalypse every few years because its superstar is unhappy that he didn’t win a championship. And since, as we’ve seen, almost nobody wins a championship, that means there are going to be a whole lot of unhappy superstars, a whole lot of uprooted fan bases, and a whole lot of rebuilding teams. 

I’ll let you decide whether or not this new breed of finicky superstars, all of whom are willing to relocate far quicker than they are willing to accept responsibility for winning and losing or demonstrate an understanding of precisely how impossible it is to win a championship, will actually create competitive balance or make it even worse. 

Is the issue really resolved if more and different teams get to hoist the Larry O’Brien trophy because LeBron, Wade, Dwight et al decide to don new jerseys and/or team up? No, I don’t think so. Not if we enter each and every season with only 3-4 teams that are legitimately capable of standing alone in June.

John Hollinger’s statistical probability model recently determined that there is a 79% chance that either Boston, Miami, or San Antonio wins the championship this year. 

In June. It’s December now. 

This is a very real and very deep problem for the NBA. And it’s what worries me about the future of professional basketball in America.