September 25, 2009
The Link Between Running Well and Passing Well

I’ve been noticing a lot of chatter recently about the Browns inability to run the ball having an effect on how poor their passing game has been. Inadequinn had this to say on Wednesday, specifically in relation to the deep passing game:

“But you have to understand, the best thing to open up things downfield is to have a running game to get more production there. So that’s something we’re trying to get better at, so when we do have the play-action fakes they’re more meaningful.”

On a base level, I understand the logic. If an offense isn’t running the ball well, a defense can sit back and play the pass and vice versa.

Having said that, I’m not totally sure this relationship actually exists. I want to believe it does because it seems to make sense, but I think there are other factors we have to at least consider.

Most notably, what Inadequinn’s talking about appears to relate directly to the idea of deception. In other words, Inadequinn’s saying, “When the defense knows what we’re doing, they’re going to stop us.”

In my mind, this suggests that the Browns offense is incapable of out-executing the opponent’s defense. Obviously, there are plenty of situations within an NFL game - we’ve all seen them - where the defense, the offense, the fans, and the guy selling cotton candy all know what kind of play is coming. I’m referring to third and long, the two minute drill, fourth and one…

These tend to be the sequences that dictate the outcome of a game. If Inadequinn’s implying that on 3rd down and 17 with 2:20 left in the fourth quarter and the Browns down by 7, he has to have had a successful running game (however that’s defined) prior to this moment in order to get the 18 yard completion downfield that he needs…well, I need help understanding this.

Of course, the rate of success on that play isn’t going to be as high as the rate of success on a 3rd and 3 - but I’d argue that that’s a “no matter what” scenario. Neither conversion rate should have much to do with how well, overall, the team has passed and/or ran the ball earlier in the game.

The good teams execute and the bad ones don’t.

And the Browns, let’s just be honest, probably aren’t a very good football team.

Further, I think it’s fair to argue that the relationship between passing well and running well is at least somewhat reciprocal. What I mean by this is that a football game has to start somewhere - offenses and defenses begin the first quarter with expectations about what their opponent is capable of. If the Browns have proven that they can’t throw the ball, as they have, then the defense is free to stop the run until the Browns demonstrate an ability to throw the ball. If that demonstration never comes, then it seems unfair to criticize the running game for not being able to pass the ball. Isn’t it also the fault of the passing game that there’s no running game?

The link up above takes you to an article that will certainly give anyone who hated taking statistics in college (Dad.com, I’m looking at you) an extreme headache, but it’s statistical analysis that attempts to establish the correlation between running efficiency and passing efficiency to a team’s win-rate, as well as how interconnected running well and passing well are, if good offenses are good at both.

Surprisingly, the analysis actually suggests that good teams aren’t efficient at both the pass and the run - they’re much more efficient at the pass. This coincides with a few other research pieces I’ve been reading that argue teams win by throwing the ball well, which I believe has a lot to do with the pass being a high risk-high reward proposition. Throwing well cuts down on the risk and elevates the reward…the result is an explosive offense.

Food for thought dog, get a plate.

September 24, 2009
QB Pocket Time

I’m absolutely thrilled that someone is tracking this…click on the link to see the average length of time your favorite QB has held onto the ball before being sacked this season.

Quinn comes in at 3.29 seconds - let’s watch this as the season progresses.

The Trouble With Time of Possession

Anyone who watched the Dolphins-Colts game on Monday Night Football this week, will probably immediately know where I’m coming from with this post. If you didn’t, you can read the recap of the game and check out the box score.

My major point gets back to something we’ve discussed previously and that is the fact that you can control field position and time of possession all you want…you can manage the game until the cows come home…but you better get the ball in the end zone or you are giving yourself a prime opportunity to lose.

Not to mention that if your team is built offensively to eat up clock than you’re probably going to have problems scoring quickly, if you need to, like if you’re down 4 points with over 2 minutes left the game.

The Dolphins-Colts game on Monday was an extreme, but perfect, example of this. Here, one team - the Dolphins - had the ball for 45:07 and another team - the Colts - had it for 14:53.

The Colts scored 27 points off of 3 TD’s and 2 FG’s while the Dolphins scored 23 points off of 2 TD’s and 3 FG’s.

Dolphins QB Chad Pennington threw one interception and the Dolphins’ kicker, Dan Carpenter missed one FG (of course, if he’d made it, the Dolphins still would’ve lost). Indianapolis had zero turnovers.

Of course, it’s also important to note that part of the reason the Dolphins were able to have the ball for so long was because Indy was capable of scoring so quickly. Miami, obviously, would’ve preferred to put themselves in a position to control the clock by stopping Indianapolis on defense…that didn’t happen, Miami kicked more FG’s than they scored TD’s, and they lost the game.

The passing/running stats for Indianapolis also call into question the need for a running game to support the passing game, as they only rushed the ball 11 times for 61 yards while throwing it 23 times for 303 yards. Yes, that’s 5.55 yards per rushing attempt, but the Colts threw the ball 68% of the time and 8 of those 11 rushes came in the first half, so Miami knew what was coming.

This analysis would be more relevant to the Browns if we knew what the hell they were trying to do on offense. Personally, I don’t. I know that Inadequinn told Terry Pluto on Sunday after the game that he has to go to Mike Furrey when he has him one-on-one in the corner…like Terry, I struggle to understand why this is. It’s not as if finding Furrey in single coverage is a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow type opportunity. Teams are never going to double Mike Furrey with Braylon Edwards on the field.

Inadequinn added that it’s better to throw the ball away in that situation than to throw an interception and lose out on the field goal attempt. Games like this one between Indianapolis and Miami make me wonder if Inadequinn’s approach is flawed.

How valuable, really, is a field goal?

Could it be better to take a risk and try to make a play in pursuit of a TD - with the possibility of throwing a pick - than to settle for a shot at scoring three points?

Scoring touchdowns is the name of the game. When you break it down like that, football isn’t so complicated.

September 9, 2009
Could Week One Start With Derek Anderson?

For most of the media in Cleveland, speculation about who the starting quarterback will be when the Browns run out of the tunnel on Sunday has ended: Brady Quinn should and will be the guy.

While I don’t necessarily disagree, I’m not sure my reasons for feeling similarly are the same as theirs. I believe the Browns have an asset in Quinn that the previous regime spent assets to acquire - the organization needs to determine the value of this asset, something that probably entails Quinn playing the entirety of a substantial amount of games.

As with many things in life, however, there is a counterargument to this point of view, and it revolves around the value of the unknown, the depth of the team’s weaknesses, and how Alpha Dog sees the future of the franchise.

Like I’ve written in the past, we don’t know much about Brady Quinn. There’s no firm body of work to analyze and discussions about his future performance are merely speculation. The coaches know more than we do because they see what’s going on in the huddle and in the infamous classroom. I’m sure they have a sense of how well he’ll do based on past experiences, but they can’t really know.

And I’m sure they’re smart enough to be aware of this.

This raises an interesting question. Could Quinn’s potential be more valuable than his actual production? In other words, could he be a more valuable asset for the Browns now when no one really knows how good he is than once he starts playing and his true worth is determined?

As we know from observing numerous pro drafts and reading books like Moneyball, player personnel executives have been making decisions based on potential for pretty much all of history. It’s a consistently risky practice that rarely pays off - but this doesn’t stop execs and scouts from going down that road because talent evaluators make their name spotting diamonds in the rough and “creating” players, not by objectively analyzing the same concrete information that everyone else has access to. It’s a high risk high reward gambit.

Inevitably, this means Quinn’s potential has value - how much, of course, is hard for us, as outside observers, to say. And whether or not it’s higher than his actual value is impossible to say since that’s a complete unknown.

But what if Mangini thinks the rest of his team is so weak that it really doesn’t matter who’s playing quarterback?

As footnoted in The Blind Side by Michael Lewis, football stats analyst Ben Alamar argues that “time in the pocket and the rate at which the quarterback is under pressure are the two most important aspects of a team’s performance (both offensively and defensively).”

So what if the offensive line isn’t any good? What if the defense can’t pressure opposing quarterbacks? Further, what if Alpha Dog believes the QB position is overvalued, that it’s really all about the system and how the different pieces fit within that system?

We can certainly be sure that one player does not make a team in the NFL.

Taking this logic one step further then, let’s imagine that maybe the most valuable QB to Mangini is the one that can get him the most in return from some other team. If we’re to believe that Quinn’s potential is the biggest selling point of any of the three QBs that are currently on the roster than it makes no sense to play him with flawed players, lose games, maybe see him get hurt, and watch his value deteriorate. It makes more sense to play Anderson and trade Quinn to a desperate franchise that could be fleeced by the allure of his potential.

Let’s not forget that there’s also the distinct possibility that Mangini believes Brett Ratliff is the future QB of this franchise - he didn’t trade for him for the hell of it - and whoever has the spot now is merely a placeholder, at least for this year and maybe for next season as well.

There’s no way to know for sure, but if Anderson ends up starting on Sunday and Cleveland Browns Stadium erupts into an earthquake of boos, this is at least one stab at what’s going on in the mind of Mangini.

September 6, 2009
Innovation in Offenses in the NFL

An article from the NY Times about how the pervasiveness of the spread offense in the college game is affecting the pros.

The chess match aspect of pro football is what’s

I’ll be back on Tuesday. I’ve got a college football article coming and a bigger NFL piece later in the week.

Happy Labor Day, a day of work in which no one works.